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Abstract
Trade secret literature does not thoroughly consider information
asymmetries between companies and employees. This Article
visualizes the flows of technical information in and between
companies and employees and categorizes two types of
information asymmetries in the information transactions. The
information asymmetries cannot be effectively governed by
contracts and trade secret law. Companies employ covenants not
to compete (“CNCs”), non-disclosure agreements (“NDAs”), and
trade secret protection to shift the legal risks borne by employees
from the disclosure risks borne by the companies, both
restraining and aggravating the information asymmetries. The
contracts and the law cannot increase employee loyalty to
eliminate the information asymmetries. The risk shifting is not
only costly to the companies, but it also harms innovation by
employees and society due to the inevitable information
asymmetries. Moreover, courts are inconsistent in enforcing the
contracts and trade secret law for promoting innovation and
other policy reasons. This Article revisits the literature that
concerns the balance and the efficiency of the contracts and trade
secret law for innovation. It argues that courts reward companies
for training employees and investing in innovation by enforcing
trade secrets and CNCs to supplement the ineffective NDAs used
by companies. CNCs are less efficient for innovation than trade
secret law. Thus, this Article suggests that courts rely on a strong
trade secret regime when distributing training and innovation
rewards. The strong trade secret regime adopts the inevitable
disclosure doctrine and allows a broad scope of trade secret
protection, rather than enforcing broad NDAs or CNCs, which
are less efficient for innovation than trade secret law. At least,
this regime should not impair employee loyalty.
I. Introduction
Waymo LLC (“Waymo”), Google’s spin-off, repeatedly
chased after its departing employees who joined its rival—Uber
Techs., Inc. (“Uber”)—through the arbitration system and the
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judicial system for trade secret concerns.1 In recent years, the
most famous and influential disputes in Silicon Valley are the
disputes between Waymo and Anthony Levandowski—a former
Google employee, Waymo’s co-founder, and star engineer in selfdriving2—but spun out from Google and sold his spin-out startup
Otto Trucking LLC (“Otto”) to Uber.3 In Waymo’s legal claim of
trade secret misappropriation against Uber and Levandowski,
Waymo alleges that Levandowski downloaded over 14,000
confidential files from Waymo, which were improperly employed
by Levandowski, Otto, and Uber.4 Evidence of downloads were
admitted by the court,5 resulting in a settlement between
Waymo and Uber to share Uber’s self-driving business.
However, Waymo continues to pursue rewards from
Levandowski in arbitration proceedings and for criminal
penalties against him under criminal trade secret doctrines.6 If
there is no civil trade secret misappropriation acknowledged by
the court, how likely is it that a former employee will be
prosecuted for trade secret theft? Levandowski had no plan to
pay the rewards assigned by arbitrators and struggled against
33 counts of theft and attempted theft of trade secrets, 7 but
recently pleaded guilty to stealing those 14,000 confidential files
in exchange for federal prosecutors dropping the other 32

1 See Paresh Dave, Waymo Secures Bigger Award Against Workers Who
Went
to
Rival
Uber,
REUTERS
(Jan.
9,
2020
8:35
PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-waymo-uber/waymo-secures-biggeraward-against-workers-who-went-to-rival-uber-idUSKBN1Z904D (reporting
that Uber arbitrated against two departing employees who joined Uber other
than Anthony Levandowski).
2 See generally Burkhard Bilger, Auto Correct: Has the Self-Driving Car
at
Last
Arrived?,
NEW
YORKER
(Nov.
18,
2013),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/11/25/auto-correct
(introducing
the history and background of Google’s self-driving project and the contribution
made by Levandowski).
3 See Bernie Woodall, Uber Buys Self-Driving Truck Startup Otto; Teams
with
Volvo,
REUTERS
(Aug.
18,
2016
12:50
PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-uber-tech-volvo-otto-idUSKCN10T1TR.
4 Waymo LLC v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. C 17-00939, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
73843, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 15, 2017).
5 Id. at *41–43.
6 Associated Press, Ex-Google Engineer Anthony Levandowski Is Charged
with Trade Secrets Theft, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 27, 2019 4:02 PM),
https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2019-08-27/ex-google-engineeranthony-levandowski-is-charged-with-trade-secrets-theft.
7 Id.
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counts.8 It is also the hopeless eleventh year that Sergey
Aleynikov, a former employee of Goldman Sachs (“Goldman”), is
fighting his trade secret theft case, while there has been a civil
decision exempting him from the civil claim of trade secret
misappropriation.9 Because of downloading confidential source
code from Goldman and employing the code at his new employer,
Aleynikov might have been liable for the civil claim if Goldman
found the downloading earlier before the expiration of the
statute of limitations.10
Besides the confidential information, are there any other
losses that drive Waymo and Goldman Sachs mad after Waymo
made a deal with Uber, and Goldman asserted no material
losses?11 After investing in research and development (“R&D”)
and training employees, companies face indefinable losses due
to the departure of employees, which may be definable after a
long time and uncompensable.12 However, there are talented
employees like Levandowski and Aleynikov, who are the
inventors deploying the R&D investment, but are antipathetic
to being trapped by a company. They may resign with some
knowledge when they believe that they do not own any binding
legal liabilities to the company.13 Can companies investigate
what the exact knowledge is within the statute of limitations? If
they could, should courts assign the companies a full recovery

8
Nick Statt, Self-Driving Car Engineer Anthony Levandowski Pleads
Guilty to Stealing Google Trade Secrets, THE VERGE (Mar 19, 2020, 8:26 PM),
https://www.theverge.com/2020/3/19/21187651/anthony-levandowski-pleadsguilty-google-waymo-uber-trade-secret-theft-lawsuit.
9 See Peter J. Henning, A Former Goldman Employee’s Long, Strange
Legal
Odyssey,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
30,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/30/business/dealbook/a-former-goldmanemployees-long-strange-legal-odyssey.html. Jonathan Stempel, Former
Goldman Programmer Fails, Again, to Toss Theft Conviction, REUTERS (Oct. 8,
2019
3:40
PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-goldman-sachsaleynikov/former-goldman-programmer-fails-again-to-toss-theft-convictionidUSKBN1WN2AR (reporting that Aleynikov has been arrested twice since
2009 for the trade secret disputes between him and his former employer
Goldman Sachs).
10 Aleynikov v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., No. 12-5994, 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 155137, at *7–8 (D.N.J. Oct. 29, 2013).
11 Id. at *2, 59 (finding that the claims of breach of contract and trade are
barred for the statute of limitations).
12 See, e.g., id.
13 See, e.g., id. at *21–23 (reciting Aleynikov’s claim that he did not sign
any confidential contracts).
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for the employee departure with the knowledge under contract
law and trade secret law? From a legal perspective and a law
and economics perspective, this Article argues that the answer
is no to both questions due to inevitable asymmetric information.
The United States (“U.S.”) constantly strengthens its trade
secret regime for social demand.14 Technology develops faster
than the development of law. 15 Patent protection by itself is
never sufficient for protecting technical information. 16 Surveys
show that U.S. companies, especially large companies, view
trade secrets more important than patents.17 However, it is
common that companies are like Goldman, taking years to
ascertain their loss of confidential information.18 After the U.S.
federal system adopted the Defend Trade Secrets Act (“DTSA”)
to set up the federal jurisdiction for hearing civil trade secret
claims in 2016,19 Senator Kamala Harris introduced a bill to
revise the DTSA in 2019 by increasing the exemplary damages
and extending the statute of limitations for trade secret
misappropriations.20 Can the current trade secret regime
supplemented by such a bill reduce trade secret complaints and
delight both the innovative companies, such as Waymo and
14 Katherine Linton, The Importance of Trade Secrets: New Directions in
International Trade Policy Making and Empirical Research, U.S. INT’L TRADE
COMMISSION J. INT’L COM. & ECON. 1,
5–6 (Sept.
2016),
https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/journals/katherine_linton_importance
_of_trade_secrets_0.pdf.
15 David S. Almeling, Seven Reasons Why Trade Secrets Are Increasingly
Important, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1091, 1108 (2012).
16
E.g., Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014)
(discussing ambiguities about the patentable subject matters). See Bronwyn
Hall et al., The Choice Between Formal and Informal Intellectual Property: A
Review, 52 J. ECON. LITERATURE 375, 418–19 (2014) (suggesting that trade
secrets and patents are usually used as complements to each other).
17 E.g., James J. Anton & Dennis A. Yao, Little Patents and Big Secrets:
Managing Intellectual Property, 35 RAND J. ECON. 1, 1 n.1 (2004) (discussing
how larger companies rely more on trade secrets than patents); Vincenzo
Denicolo & Luigi Alberto Franzoni, Patents, Secrets, and the First-Inventor
Defense, 13 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 517, 520 (2004). But see Josh Lerner,
Using Litigation to Understand Trade Secrets: A Preliminary Exploration,
SSRN
(Aug.
7,
2006),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=922520.
18 BRIAN T. YEH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43714, PROTECTION OF TRADE
SECRETS: OVERVIEW OF CURRENT LAW AND LEGISLATION, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.
13–14 (2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/R43714.pdf (suggesting that firms
spend years to realize the loss of trade secrets).
19 Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, 18 U.S.C. § 1836 (West 2016).
20 S. 1865, 116th Cong. § 1 (2019).
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Goldman, and innovative employees, such as Levandowski and
Aleynikov, for promoting innovation?
The literature, however, is controversial about the
relationship between the strength of trade secret protection and
innovation. Since the 1990’s, legal scholars have seen the
importance of discussing the efficiency of trade secret law. 21
Trade secret protection may suggest high social costs, including,
but not limited to, the security costs required by the law and
independent invention costs for the public.22 However, scholars
have not thoroughly discussed the efficiency of trade secret
law.23
Linton suggests that strengthening trade secret
protection and innovation are positively related at the
international level.24 Some scholars believe that trade secrets
promote innovation by reducing employee mobility25 and
knowledge spillovers to competitors. 26 If employees understand
that they cannot bring the technical information learned from
companies, they prefer to stay.27 Moreover, Lemley believes that
trade secret protection is more efficient than private investment
in precaution against disclosing technical information to
21 See Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in
Search of Justification, 86 CAL. L. REV. 241, 264 (1998).
22 See David D. Friedman et al., Some Economics of Trade Secret Law, 5
J. ECON. PERSP. 61, 67 (1991).
23 See id. (omitting the cost discussion about trade secret law). See also
Joshua Lerner, The Importance of Patent Scope: An Empirical Analysis, 25
RAND J. ECON. 319 (1994) (failing to prove the efficiency of trade secret law);
Bone, supra note 21, at 265–69 (criticizing the failure of Lerner and Friedman
et al. in efficiency study about trade secret law).
24 Linton, supra note 14, at 11.
25 See Sharon K. Sandeen & David S. Levine, Trade Secrets and Climate
Change: Uncovering Secret Solutions to the Problem of Greenhouse Gas
Emissions, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND CLIMATE
CHANGE 352, 359 (Joshua D. Sarnoff ed., 2016); I.P.L. Png, Trade Secrets, NonCompetes, and Mobility of Engineers and Scientists: Empirical Evidence, 2–3
(Aug.
2012),
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/f749/68d6c888d3648222263e90889f4040f1a8
8b.pdf.
26 See Tobias Schmidt, An Empirical Analysis of the Effects of Patents and
Secrecy on Knowledge Spillovers, CTR. EUR. ECON. RES. 10–11 (2006),
https://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=69807811608609510708408910
9100080096030023066052042011074117101014072065004022108026016061
0180040290420190671161180740880920470390920280281151020750041230
1801000700700300612307506700601708111308101911600607509402312011
8071023016107073024010127004&EXT=pdf.
27 See David S. Levine & Ted Sichelman, Why Do Startups Use Trade
Secrets?, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 751, 768 (2018).
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employees.28 By contrast, Schmidt reminded the importance of
external knowledge (i.e., knowledge spillovers contributed by
others) to innovation and company growth.29 Contigiani et al.
also suggest that employer-friendly trade secret law has adverse
effects on innovation for undervaluing the innovation efforts
made by employees.30 Overall, scholars consistently suggest
that trade secret protection should be balanced. Trade secrets
under proper legal protection should promote innovation,
stimulate clusters, and do not prohibit knowledge access.31 By
contrast, over-protection of trade secrets eliminates knowledge
spillovers and reduces clusters.32
Granting injunctive relief without actual harm under the
inevitable disclosure doctrine (“IDD”)33 or the DTSA confirms
the control right of the fruits of R&D investment. However,
lavishing injunctions conveys over-rewarded first-mover
advantages.34 In order to provide proper and balanced trade
secret protection, courts have to decide the expiration of trade
secrets because there is no legislative expiration date for trade
secrets, while companies prefer trade secrets to patents for the
perpetual protection of trade secrets.35 The expiration of trade
secrets implies terminating the first-mover advantages of trade
secret owners and the spillover benefits of the public.36 The
difficulty for courts originates from their power to assign the
benefits.
28 Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as
IP Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV. 311, 334–35 (2008).
29 Schmidt, supra note 26.
30 Andrea Contigiani et al., Trade Secrets and Innovation: Evidence from
the “Inevitable Disclosure” Doctrine, 39 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 2921, 2924 (2018).
31 See id. at 2922 (suggesting that trade secret protection needs to be
balanced for promoting innovation); Andrea Fosfuri & Thomas Ronde, HighTech Clusters, Technology Spillovers, and Trade Secret Laws, 22 INT’L J. INDUS.
ORG. 45, 45 (2004); Andrew A. Schwartz, The Corporate Preference for Trade
Secret, 74 OHIO ST. L. J. 623, 633–34 (2013); Sandeen & Levine, supra note 25,
at 352.
32 Fosfuri & Ronde, supra note 31, at 45.
33 See, e.g., PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262 (7th Cir. 1995).
34 See infra Sections V.B, V.C.
35 See Sudipto Bhattacharya & Sergei Guriev, Patents vs. Trade Secrets:
Knowledge Licensing and Spillover, 4 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N. 1112, 1116 (2006);
Schwartz, supra note 31, at 647.
36
Levine & Sichelman, supra note 27, at 811 (emphasizing the
importance of first-mover benefits given by trade secret protection to
companies).
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Based on the U.S. trade secret law, this Article explores the
efficiency and the balance of enforcing trade secret protection by
courts in civil cases for promoting innovation. The contribution
of this Article is that it traces and maps the process of technical
information formation and the information transactions
between companies and employees. Employees can be either the
originators of valuable technical information or the agents of
deploying the information in business, or both.37 Accordingly,
this Article highlights two types of inevitable information
asymmetries: first, employees may self-teach some technical
information held by the company; second, employees may not
disclose the innovative technical information originated by them
to the company.38 The two types of information asymmetries
result in moral-hazard problems and suggests increased
probable deadweight losses to companies after investing in
R&D.
In order to explore the balance of governing technical
information disclosure, this Article focuses on three primary
trade secret protection measures against technical information
disclosure by employees: (1) covenants of not to compete
(“CNCs”); (2) non-disclosure agreements (“NDAs”); and (3) the
trade secret legal doctrines under the Uniform Trade Secret Act
(“UTSA”)39 and the DTSA. NDAs, or confidentiality agreements,
prohibit employees from unauthorized disclosure of the
employer’s confidential information.40 CNCs regulate that
employees shall not compete with the employer “in the
employer’s existing or contemplated businesses for a designated
period of time (e.g., three to five years) in a specified
geographical region that corresponds to the market in which the
employer participates” after the termination of employment.41
However, all of those legal measures have uncertainties and
shortcomings to eliminate the information asymmetries,
See infra Part II.
See infra Section II.C.
39 UNIF. TRADE SECRET ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985).
40
See Miles J. Feldman, Toward a Clearer Standard of Protectable
Information: Trade Secrets and the Employment Relationship, 9 BERKLEY
TECH. L. J. 151, 179 (1994). Stuart J. H. Graham & Ted Sichelman, Why Do
Start-Ups Patent?, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1063, 1082 (2008).
41
Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology
Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete,
74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 602–03 (1999).
37
38
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resulting in inefficiency in promoting innovation. Thus, this
Article revisits the literature concerning the efficiency and the
inefficiency of the contracts and trade secret law under the track
of the information flows between companies and employees, and
explores the balance of enforcing them for courts.
This Article argues that CNCs and trade secret law are
conditional rewards for companies to supplement NDAs.
Instead of lavishly enforcing NDAs, a more efficient combination
for innovation is to narrowly enforce NDAs but broadly recognize
trade secrets. While both CNCs and the IDD under trade secret
law can restrict employee mobility, they are not equivalent.42
The rewards given by enforcing CNCs are cheaper but less
efficient than trade secret law (including the IDD) in terms of
encouraging innovation.43 Contracts and trade secret law
convert the disclosure risks borne by companies to legal risks
borne by employees.44 This Article suggests that under the
fiduciary duties imposed by contracts or law, employee loyalty is
still important but cannot be effectively increased by the
discussed legal measures.45 The risk-shifting by legal security
measures may place innovation conducted by employees
opposite to R&D invested by companies.46 Courts should not
send signals to disregard employee loyalty in civil cases,
regardless of whether courts can improve employee ethics and
prevent trade secret thefts by enforcing criminal doctrines.47
Part II maps the information transactions between a
company and its employees, and visualizes the two types of
information asymmetries in the transactions.
Part III
introduces how contracts (i.e., CNCs and NDAs) and trade secret
law govern the technical information disclosure by employees.
Part IV analyzes the risks of the disclosure under legal security
measures, the ineffectiveness of the legal security measures
which exaggerates the risks, and innovation impacted by the
risks. Part V discusses the efficiency of enforcing the contracts
and trade secret law on innovation.

42
43
44
45
46
47

See infra Section V.B.
See infra Sections V.B, V.C.
See infra Section IV.D
See infra Sections IV.B, IV.C, IV.D, V.D.
See infra Section IV.D.
See infra Section V.D.
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II. Internal Technical Information Transactions
Innovation, R&D, production, and marketing need to
exchange and use technical information. Figure 1 depicts a
decision tree, which shows how a unit of technical information is
deployed by companies and employees after the information is
independently created and held by either side of them. Both a
company and employees can control the technical information
produced by the company’s investment, depending on who is the
direct creator of the information.48 When holding control, the
company and employee inventors have the choice to disclose the
information to each other or outsiders. Phase I knowledge
transactions from companies to employees constitute employee
training, exchanging for Phase II knowledge transactions from
employees to employers. On the one hand, the strength of the
control dynamically varies between the company and employees
in the internal knowledge transactions. On the other hand,
continuous R&D also happens in the transactions of information
between companies and employees.
In Figure 1, “root” is the root of the decision tree is a unit of
creative technical information (T). “Target nodes,” represented
by the circle nodes at the end of each path of the decision tree,
describe the possible existing forms of the creative technical
information from the perspective of the employer. When the
company controls the information, it can become a part of a
patent (P1), be placed in the public domain (D), or be treated as
a trade secret and be used in the current/1st-generation product
or producing process (P2), in the second generation product or
producing process (P3), to send signals to competitors,
consumers, or investors (P4), or with no specific goals (P5). When
an employee inventor controls the information, the information
can be transferred to the company and achieve the above targets
or be remained with the employee as information asymmetries.
The employee can retain control of the information in the form
of deadweight loss (L) or transfer the information to others. The
employer’s direct competitors can use the information as the
company’s homogeneous product (H1). The company’s non-direct
competitors can use the information as the company’s
48
See JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF CORPORATE FINANCE 389 (2006)
(discussing the allocation of control rights of shares between outsiders and
insiders).
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heterogeneous product (H2).
Finally, “decision nodes,”
represented by the rectangles in Figure 1, represent
uncertainties to be explored by the company and decisions to be
made by the company or the employee inventor. When the
company and the employee explore legal uncertainties or make
transaction decisions, there are costs posted. The costs vary
with T, the company’s intellectual property (IP) management,
the employment contracts, and the employee’s education,
knowledge, experience, and skills.
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Figure 1. Technical Information Transactions Between the Company and
Employee Inventors.49
49
The logic of this theoretical figure is originated by the author and
expressed in a serious of studies. This figure focuses on the flow of information
transactions and is another expression of the information accessibility by the
public, which is expressed in Figure 1 in Runhua Wang, Information
Asymmetry and the Inefficiency of Informal IP Strategies Within Employment
Relationships 15 (May 20, 2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author).
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Phase I Knowledge Transactions: from Companies to Employees

The internal transactions of technical information from companies
to employees who do not create the information are a process of training.
Companies have the incentives to disclose the technical information to
these employees to use in production or marketing or further develop the
information in R&D. 50 In internal transactions, the information control
held by companies is not stable, depending on the information’s existing
forms. If a company holds the information, and the information exists in
a patent or in the public domain, the company has absolute control of the
information.51 When employees can access or learn the information that
is not publicly available, the company has relative control over the
information because of the risks of unauthorized information leakage by
employees.52 The company considers disclosure risks in its translations of
technical information with its employees.
1.

Public Information

Companies have control over the public technical information
only when the information is under patent protection.53 Filing patent
applications is the primary way that an information holder discloses its
technical information.54 A reasonable information holder maximizes his
income received from the information.55 Thus, the information holder is
hardly able to disclose its information for free.56 Patent law allows patent
holders to be compensated from the market and provides patent holders at
least first-mover advantages.57 When patent applications are rejected, or
patents have expired, the technical information embedded in the patent

See Lemley, supra note 28 at 332.
See 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2020).
52 See Png, supra note 25, at 1–3.
53 See 35 U.S.C. § 261.
54
See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 359-363 (2003).
55 ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 12–13 (6th ed.
2012).
56 See Bhattacharya & Guriew, supra note 35, at 1115 (suggesting the
nature of knowledge in business is to sell the knowledge). But see Schmidt,
supra note 26 (suggesting the benefits of a marketing stunt after open
innovation).
57 See Levine & Sichelman, supra note 27, at 755.
50
51
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applications or patents drops in the public domain passively.58 The
information holder then loses its control of the information.
Companies do not prohibit, but rather encourage, internal
transactions of their technical information if the information is under
patent protection.59 Employees need to use the information when
conducting their work, which gives companies incentives to reduce the
learning costs of the information for employees. Moreover, it is a common
strategy for companies to protect their technical information against
employees by filing patent applications.60 Regardless if outsiders learn
the information through employees, the company that is a patent holder
can protect the information by suing for patent infringement.61
Patents, however, are a limited exiting form of much technical
information. First, the technical information should be qualified as
patentable subject matter; it must be within the scope of “process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.”62 However, besides this
fundamental barrier, the scope of patent protection is not clear.63 Second,
patents are expensive in application, maintenance, and litigation. 64 If a
patent cannot bring enough revenue or investment to offset the costs of
patent application and maintenance, small businesses hesitate to file patent
applications but prefer trade secrets to patents.65 Third, companies do not
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 122, 371.
See Lemley, supra note 28.
60 April M. Franco & Matthew F. Mitchell, Covenants Not to Compete,
Labor Mobility, and Industry Dynamics, 17 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 581,
603 (2008).
61 35 U.S.C. § 271.
62 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1952). The European Patent Office (“EPO”) does not
provide patent protection for discoveries; scientific theories; mathematical
methods; aesthetic creations; schemes; rules and methods for performing
mental acts; playing games or doing business, and programs for computers;
and presentations of information if patent applications do not have other
technical features. See The European Patent Convention, art. 52, June 2016,
Eur. Patent Conv. See also 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50, 52 & 57 (Jan. 7, 2019) (defining mathematical
concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity, and mental processes
as “abstract ideas,” which are hardly subjective to patent eligibility).
63 See Lerner, supra note 17, at 7. See generally Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank
Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014) (blurring the boundaries of patentable subject
matters by vague language in the court decision).
64
See Suzanne Scotchmer & Jerry Green, Novelty and Disclosure in
Patent Law, 21 RAND J. ECON. 131 (1990). See also Douglas C. Lippoldt &
Mark F. Schultz, Uncovering Trade Secrets - An Empirical Assessment of
Economic Implications of Protection for Undisclosed Data 9 (OECD Trade
Policy Papers No. 167, 2014); Almeling, supra note 15, at 1116; Lerner, supra
note 17, at 5.
65 See Anthony Arundel, The Relative Effectiveness of Patents and Secrecy
58
59
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use patents to protect valuable inventions for not disclosing the
inventions.66 Most advanced technologies are protected under trade
secrets.67 Moreover, survey data suggest that companies use trade secrets
more often than patents.68
2.

Unpublished Technical Information

When the technical information held by a company is not publicly
available, the company treats it as trade secrets.69 The company can
affirmatively use the technical information in its first-generation products,
the production of the first-generation products (P2), or the development of
the second-generation products (P3).
Alternatively, the technical
information can be deployed as negative trade secrets, advertised as
business tricks (P4), or deposited as a secret per se (P5) by the employer.70
Even though negative trade secrets are not activated by the information
holder in its products or production, business tricks deter competitors or
for Appropriation, 30 RES. POL’Y 611, 613 (2001); Nishant Dass et al.,
Intellectual Property Protection and Financial Markets: Patenting vs. Secrecy 4
(May
19,
2015),
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/researchfaculty/clbe/events/innovation/documents/DassNandaXiao.pdf;
Levine
&
Sichelman, supra note 27, at 763–64; Lemley, supra note 28, at 331. But see
Josh Lerner, Patenting in the Shadow of Competitors, 38 J. L. & ECON. 563
(1995); Lerner, supra note 17, at 4; Anton & Yao, supra note 17, at 3 (arguing
that small innovations should be all protected under patents).
66 See Bhattacharya & Guriev, supra note 35, at 1117, 1142.
67 Sandeen & Levine, supra note 25, at 352–53.
68
See John Kitching & Robert Blackburn, Intellectual Property
Management in the Small and Medium Enterprise (SME), 5 J. SMALL BUS. &
ENTERPRISE DEV. 327, 329–32 (1998) (showing British SMEs prefer trade
secrets to patents by survey data); Linton, supra note 14, at 6. See, e.g., Trade,
Investment, & Industrial Policies in India: Effects on the U.S. Economy, Inv.
No. 332-543, USITC Pub. 4501, at *140 (Dec. 2014) (showing that trade secrets
are more important to US “internationally-engaged” companies than patents,
copyrights, and trademarks by survey data); Stuart J. H. Graham et al., High
Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley
Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255, 1310 (finding that one-third of
people do not file patent applications for preventing technology disclosure).
69 See Lippoldt & Schultz, supra note 64, at 6 (categorizing three types of
trade secrets, including technical information, confidential business
information, and know-how). Know-how is considered as a type of technical
information in this research. Id.
70 See Bhattacharya & Guriev, supra note 35, at 1115 (suggesting no
incentives for companies to disclose their knowledge for free). See also Michael
A. Epstein & Stuart D. Levi, Protecting Trade Secret Information: A Plan for
Proactive Strategy, 43 BUS. LAW. 887, 887–88 (May 1988) (categorizing trade
secrets as trade secrets used in business, trade secrets providing a competitive
advantage, or trade secrets as secrets per se).
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suggest values to competitors or alliances.71 By contrast, the deposited
secrets per se sleep and do not suggest any imminent economic value.72
Overall, keeping the technical information in secret may maximize the net
present value of the technical information.73
The transaction of unpublished technical information from
companies to employees who do not create the information is a process of
training regardless of whether this process has the value of R&D,
production, or marketing. Employees cannot learn technical information
that is a trade secret unless the company trains them. On the one hand,
employees have incentives to learn the knowledge and reduce the training
costs for companies.74 On the other hand, the training costs are not zero
due to the costs of opaque information and increase as the company
increases the opacity and keeps the information secret.75
The concerns about spillovers of unpublished technical
information prevent companies from training employees with unpublished
technical information. After employees have access to technical
information, knowledge spillovers are reducible but inevitable due to the
difficulties and high costs in keeping knowledge in secrets.76 Employee
mobility and employee-involved external communications may trigger
knowledge spillovers.77 Spillovers create potential competitors78 and are
losses to companies.79 Survey data show that departing employees are
71
See Dass et al., supra note 65, at 22 (criticizing the inefficient
information asymmetry resulted from trade secrets).
72 See Michael Risch, Why Do We Have Trade Secrets?, 11 MARQ. INTELL.
PROP. L. REV. 1, 22, 32 (2007) (suggesting that secret information itself as
secrecy has value).
73 See Schwartz, supra note 31, at 664 (reasoning from the perpetuity of
trade secrets and corporations).
74
See Png, supra note 25, at 20 (suggesting that employees make
tradeoffs between low wages and training in their early-career stages).
75 See Dass et al., supra note 65, at 1 (suggesting the costs of opacity and
the costs of trade secrets).
76 See Schmidt, supra note 26, at 6.
77
See Png, supra note 25, at 1–3 (suggesting less employee mobility
equals fewer knowledge spillovers between employers).
78 See Paavo Ritala et al., Knowledge Sharing, Knowledge Leaking and
Relative Innovation Performance: An Empirical Study, 35 TECHNOVATION 22,
24 (2015) (“[Knowledge leakage]. . .creates new competitors for the original
knowledge owner.”). See also C. Christopher Baughn et al., Protecting
Intellectual Capital in International Alliances, 32 J. WORLD BUS. 103, 104
(1997) (“Uncontrolled information disclosure . . . possibly help[s] to create a
future competitor.”).
79
See Bhattacharya & Guriev, supra note 35, at 1115 (suggesting
spillovers are against trade secrets and business principles of maximizing
profits).
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“the biggest threat of loss” to British companies.80 Therefore, training or
information disclosure to employees increases the risks of spillovers and
opportunity costs.81 As a result, employers may overinvest in secrecy and
block their unpublished technical information from their employees.82
B.

Phase II Knowledge Transactions: from Employees to
Companies

Besides being a receiver of knowledge trained by a company, an
employee is also a creator of knowledge and technical information.
Regardless of the controversial question of who owns the technical
information produced by an employee during employment,83 the employee
has the absolute control of the technical information before its disclosure
to the company.84 Strategically, the employee can either transfer the
technical information to the company or outsiders, or not disclose it at all,
which is a deadweight loss to society (L).
If the technical information can be exchanged for value, a
reasonable employee should have incentives to transfer it to his employer
or outsiders (i.e., another employer or a start-up), rather than keep it as a
deadweight loss (i.e., L). Employees expect internal and external career
advancement by being innovative and producing valuable technical
information.85 After an employee has disclosed the technical information
80 See Levine & Sichelman, supra note 27, at 780; Kitching & Blackburn,
supra note 68, at 329.
81 See Gilson, supra note 41, at 601 (“[T]he earlier in the invention process
an employee must make the decision to undertake a start-up, the riskier is the
employee’s human capital investment in the venture.”).
82
See Lemley, supra note 28, at 334 (discussing overinvestment in
secrecy by companies without trade secret law). See also Friedman et al., supra
note 22, at 68 (balancing the public and private costs of precautions against
theft of trade secrets).
83
See generally JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (1689).
Locke’s labor theory suggests that laborers own the property rights of what
they produce and should be able to control the fruits of their labor. See id. IP
scholars criticize this theory and believe that IP law is utilitarian and
preempts the personal interests of the laborers. See Wendy J. Gordon, A
Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural
Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L. J. 1533, 1540, 1608 (1993); Bone,
supra note 21, at 283–88.
84 See James J. Anton & Dennis A. Yao, Expropriation and Inventions:
Appropriable Rents in the Absence of Property Rights, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 190,
191 (1994) (suggesting that only inventors know the value of their inventions).
Even though technical information is more than an idea, it is not practical for
employers to monitor and react to every word that employees write on
notebooks or save on computers.
85
See Contigiani et al., supra note 30, at 2938 (stating “[career
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to his employer, there are litigation risks (e.g., trade secret
misappropriations) if the employee transfers the technical information to
others. Therefore, in theory, an employee should have stronger incentives
to transfer the technical information to his employer rather than to
outsiders.
Employees, however, have limited incentives to transfer the
technical information produced by them to their employers. Employees
make tradeoffs between learning or receiving economic and reputational
payments from companies.86 They learn from companies in the early
career stage and accept low payments as the investment to the learning.87
After learning in Phase I transactions, they look for better payments for
their knowledge or the technical information produced by them from
companies or outsiders.88 Companies can incentivize employees to
transfer knowledge to companies by increasing the compensation
employees receive.89 However, companies may not increase the
compensation because of the investment in training the employees in
Phase I transactions.90 As a result, employees have few incentives to
produce valuable technological information when they encounter both low
payments and few external opportunities.91
It is problematic that many companies do not realize the
importance of Phase II transactions of technical information from
employees to employers.92 Large companies with a big pool of knowledge
do not rely on the knowledge contributed by particular employees.93
advancement] . . . may depend on both internal-to-the firm and external career
paths”).
86 See Png, supra note 25, at 19.
87 See Jarle Moen, Is Mobility of Technical Personnel a Source of R&D
Spillovers?, 23 J. LAB. ECON. 1, 2 (2000) (showing “the youngest workers appear
to invest most heavily in on-the-job learning” by empirical evidence).
88 Id. at 20. See also Fosfuri & Ronde, supra note 31, at 47–48 (suggesting
that high-value information and high wage offered from externalities increase
mobility).
89 See Png, supra note 25, at 20 (“By reducing such outside opportunities,
trade secrets law might force employers to increase compensation.”).
90
See Jonathan M. Barnett & Ted M. Sichelman, Revisiting Labor
Mobility in Innovation Markets 3 (Univ. S. Cal. L. Sch. Legal Studies Research
Papers
Series,
Paper
No.
207,
2016),
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/df2e/ca68c18dfcde41c754697de86e00f1f822c7
.pdf (showing that low wages are paid to employees for the training costs of
employers).
91 See Png, supra note 25, at 19–20 (suggesting that employees invest
them less if they would have fewer external opportunities).
92
See id. at 19 (arguing that companies do not understand the
importance of human capital investment on their R&D).
93 See id.
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Small companies may not be able to produce valuable R&D.94 However,
a company itself does not produce any technical information, which is all
transferred from its employees.95 The technical information transferred
from employees to companies reflects the innovation efforts produced by
the employees, which are expected by companies.
C.

Problems of Information Asymmetries

Information asymmetries always exist in Phase I and Phase II
information transactions between companies and employees.96 First,
when a company controls a unit of technical information and trains its
employees with the information, the company is incapable of knowing
how much the employees actually learn.97 Second, the company is
incapable of knowing how valuable the information originated from
employees will be.98 When information is originated from employee
inventors, the company is passive to access that information.99
The first type of information asymmetries result in direct losses or
deadweight losses to the company if the employee inventor discloses the
information to others without authorization from the company. The
unauthorized information disclosure results in a direct loss when others
use the information and produces products or services competing with the
company’s first and second-generation products or services. The
disclosure results in deadweight losses to the company if others profit from
the information in other ways.
The second type of information asymmetries is deadweight losses
to the company. If the employee inventor does not disclose the
information to outsiders (i.e., L), the information is treated as a deadweight
loss to society. If the information could be valuable to the company and
See id. at 20.
See Bhattacharya & Guriev, supra note 35, at 1116 (suggesting that
knowledge buyers do not produce ideas).
96
Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON.
305, 308 (1976) (stating information asymmetry exists in agency relationships,
which are contracts “under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage
another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which
involves delegating some decision -making authority to the agent.”).
97 See Franco & Mitchell, supra note 60, at 583.
98 See Png, supra note 25, at 9 (suggesting that employers can never
understand the value of the inventions of employees the same way the
employees do).
99 See Schwartz, supra note 31, at 666 (suggesting that the nature of
secret information is information asymmetry in the transactions between the
information holder and its investors).
94
95
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protected under patents P1100 or used in the company’s first/secondgeneration products or producing the products (i.e., P2 or P3), the adverseselection problem arises. Alternatively, the employee inventor may
transfer the information to outsiders, such as a spin-out startup,101 new
employers, or other companies.
Homogenous products H1 and
heterogeneous products H2 produced by using the information result in a
loss to the company because it could be profited from the products (i.e.,
H1 and H2). Between the two types of loss, the loss of the technical
information producing homogenous products H1 is larger due to the harm
on the company’s current market share. The lost profits caused by
transferring the technical information to outsiders suggest a moral-hazard
problem resulting from information asymmetries.102
With respect to this moral-hazard problem, employees have both
abilities and motivations to transfer their creative technical information to
outsiders,103 even though employers expect loyalty from employees.104 A
piece of technical information resulting from an employee’s intelligence
has an unbalanced value to the employee inventor and his employer. First,
the employee values the technical information produced by him higher
than the company.105 Second, the information can be undervalued by the
100
Franco & Mitchell, supra note 60, at 585 (arguing that there are
companies that file patent applications to protect information and prevent
information disclosure by employees).
101
Spin-out startups are formed by employees based on their own
decisions; employees form spin-off startups as a choice of employers. See id. at
582.
102
See generally Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, Moral Hazard and
Renegotiation in Agency Contracts, 58 ECONOMETRICA J. ECON. SOC’Y 1279
(1990).
103 See Manuel Trajtenberg & Roy Shalem, Software Patents, Inventors
and
Mobility,
SSRN
101,
145
(2009),
https://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=45402609800412108401810910
6090015093000085002012023032095093074109069087095002119006057018
1220391071090120911071200220290680780250940360370130931000720970
7210400506701204608306700907112712108612402809511509800711200400
4016027004112119102096006086084&EXT=pdf (suggesting that asymmetric
information is the main incentive for job mobility of inventors); YEH, supra note
18, at 15 (listing the motivations of trade secret thefts, which include personal
financial gain).
104 Lemley, supra note 28, at 335.
105 An information holder values its information higher than the buyers
of the information. In the training story, an employer is the information holder
and values their training more than the contributions and efforts done by its
employees. In the information asymmetry story, an employee values his or her
intelligence higher than how much the employer compensates him or her for
producing the technical information. See Risch, supra note 72, at 35
(suggesting that people overvalue what they produce or own).
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company before information disclosure.106 Because of the costs of
training employees, the company pays relatively lower compensation to
employees compared to the value that the employees contribute to the
company.107 Third, employees can be compensated more from outsiders
than the company.108 The value of the technical information received from
employees also depends on how the company manipulates and deploys the
information in business.109
The moral-hazard problem can also result in the problem of
reverse selection.110 When the negotiation power of employees is weak
against the company, employees are less likely to disclose and transfer the
technical information produced by them on the employment position to
the company.111 During their employment, they may not transfer the
information to outsiders; the information is treated as a deadweight loss to
the society (i.e., L).112 After their mobility, they may use the information
with a new employer or a spin-out startup, exposing the moral-hazard
problems.113
III. Trade Secret Protection Governed by Contracts and Trade
Secret Law
The primary measures of trade secret protection include physical
restrictions, contracts, and trade secret law. The literature suggests that
trade secret protection enables companies to disclose knowledge and
secret technologies to employees.114 Physical security measures are costly
and prohibit technical information disclosure from companies to

See Png, supra note 25, at 9.
See Barnett & Sichelman, supra note 90, at 3.
108 See Bhattacharya & Guriev, supra note 35, at 1113 (suggesting the
value of knowledge spillovers to innovation).
109 See Lemley, supra note 28, at 336 (arguing that secret information can
be developed to have a higher value by externalities under Arrow’s Paradox).
110 See generally Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, Adverse Selection
and Renegotiation in Procurement, 57 REV. ECON. STUD. 597, 597 (1990).
111 Anton & Yao, supra note 84, at 192 (arguing that the inventor’s weak
negotiation power results in non-disclosure of his or her invention or spin-out
startups).
112 See Lemley, supra note 28, at 335–36.
113 See YEH, supra note 18, at 14.
114 See generally Lemley, supra note 28, at 319–20.
106
107
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employees.115 By contrast, the other two approaches of trade secret
protection reduce the social costs of information disclosure.116
The primary civil law dealing with trade secret misappropriations
is contract law (e.g., the law about enforcing CNCs and NDAs), the
Restatement (First) of Torts, the Restatement (Third) of Unfair
Competition, and trade secret law (i.e., the UTSA, the DTSA, and relevant
common law doctrines).117 In general, scholars agree that trade secret
protection under trade secret law can spur R&D.118 Empirical evidence
supports that the enactment of the UTSA and strong enforcement of trade
secret law are positively related to R&D investment by large businesses,
especially in high-tech industries.119 This Part introduces the trade secret
statutory law and the common law supplementing the statutes in trade
secret protection and discusses their uncertainties.
A.

Employment Contracts

There are mainly two types of employment contracts governing
the security of technical information. One type is CNCs, and the other
type is NDAs. Both types of contracts can prevent knowledge spillovers
caused by employee mobility. Before the beginning of developing trade
secret-specific law in common law in the late-nineteenth century,
companies and courts relied only on these two types of agreements to
protect trade secrets.120 These agreements are still used by companies to
115
See Epstein & Levi, supra note 70, at 897–98 (listing common
“affirmative steps” to keep information secret, such as locking gates, using
security orders to distinguish employees, marking employees by asking them
to wear security badges).
116 See Lemley, supra note 28, at 335; Lippoldt & Schultz, supra note 64,
at 7–8 (suggesting that trade secret protection increases R&D investment).
117 See Almeling, supra note 15, at 1106 (suggesting that even though
trade secret law varies by states and the federal level, the UTSA is a template
for the various trade secret laws). But see 18 U.S.C. § 1836 (West 2016);
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS §§ 757–59 (Am. Law Inst. 1939); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 39–45 (Am. Law Inst. 1995); Christopher
Rebel J. Pace, The Case for a Federal Trade Secrets Act, 8 HARV. J. L. & TECH.
427, 428 (1995) (arguing that trade secrets should be subject to property law,
rather than tort law); LANDES & POSNER, supra note 54, at 355 (arguing that
trade secret law is not independent of the liabilities under contract law and
tort law).
118 Lemley, supra note 28, at 326.
119 See generally I.P.L. Png, Law and Innovation: Evidence from State
Trade Secrets Laws, 99 REV. ECON. & STAT. 167 (2017).
120 See Bone, supra note 21, at 251–52 (citing Peabody v. Norfolk, 98
Mass. 452 (Mass. 1868)) (highlighting Peabody v. Norfolk as the starting point
of having trade secret common law).
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secure technical information and complement or supplement the
protection under trade secret law. CNCs are employee-based, and NDAs
are information-based to restrict employee mobility and secure technical
information transactions within a company. These two types of contracts
are primarily governed by common law but are also governed by state
statutes.121
1.

Covenants Not to Compete

CNCs encourage Phase I transactions of technical information
from companies to employees.122 Employee mobility is the primary
reason for knowledge spillovers.123 Even though CNCs may not directly
address confidential information, employers can use CNCs to retain
valued employees and reduce employee mobility.124 Furthermore, CNCs
can reduce the risks of spillovers and prevent the losses and opportunity
costs resulting from information transfers from employees to outsiders.125
By preventing spin-outs, CNCs are used to prevent competition by
startups.
Courts allow the enforcement of CNCs restrictively under two
elements: (1) the necessity of enforcing the CNC; and (2) the
reasonableness of the restraints in the CNC. 126 The enforcement of CNCs
should be necessary to protect the legitimate business interests of
employers,127 which specifically refer to trade secrets, confidential
information, and goodwill.128 With respect to the reasonableness, courts
usually consider the restrictions on time and geographical scope in
CNCs.129
For example, Texas courts require consideration for

Png, supra note 25, at 8.
See Barnett & Sichelman, supra note 90, at 3 (suggesting that CNCs
promote training employees by employers).
123 Epstein & Levi, supra note 70, at 890.
124 Procter & Gamble Co. v. Stoneham, 747 N.E.2d 268, 276 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2000) (“The [trial] court also stated that the non-competition covenant
was ‘not being used to protect confidential information, but it is used as a
measure to retain valued employees.’”).
125 Gilson, supra note 41, at 602–03.
126 See, e.g., Boulanger v. Dunkin’ Donuts Inc., 815 N.E.2d 572, 576–77
(Mass. 2004).
127 Id. at 576–77 (“A covenant not to compete is enforceable only if it is
necessary to protect a legitimate business interest, reasonably limited in time
and space, and consonant with the public interest.”).
128 See Marine Contractors Co. v. Hurley, 310 N.E.2d 915, 920 (Mass.
1974).
129 E.g., Boulanger, 815 N.E. at 576–77.
121
122
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establishing reasonableness130; New York courts weigh the losses of
employers against the restraints on employees, which should not be higher
than the former131; and Georgia law adds that CNCs are only restricted to
“key employees.”132 As a typical example, an enforceable CNC in
Wisconsin is as follows:
Upon termination of this Agreement, [employee] shall not
participate in any way, directly or indirectly, either
through direct or indirect ownership, employment or
otherwise, in any business which deals with or relates to
products or services which are the same or similar to those
manufactured and/or sold by [employer] in the field of fine
chemistry, pharmaceuticals and electronic components,
for a period of one year in the American continents and
Japan. In addition, [employee] shall cease all contacts
with any existing or prospective customers of [employer]
as well as with its suppliers, provided that [employee]
may maintain such contacts in the pursuit of business not
competing, whether directly or indirectly, with that of
[employer].133
While the above examples show that CNCs are unlikely to be
unconditionally enforceable, CNCs are not consistently enforceable in the
U.S., either. PBC News Hour reports that about 40% of Americans have
signed CNCs, but only about 20% of the CNCs are binding.134 Some states
that have “anti-CNC” statutes to govern unfair competition and the
freedom of employment disfavor or constrict the use of CNCs,135 such as
130

2008).

See generally Powerhouse Prods. v. Scott, 260 S.W.3d 693 (Tex. App.

131 See BDO Seidman v. Hirshberg,712 N.E.2d 1220, 1223 (N.Y. 1999) (“A
restraint is reasonable only if it: (1) is no greater than is required for the
protection of the legitimate interest of the employer, (2) does not impose undue
hardship on the employee, and (3) is not injurious to the public.”).
132 GA. CODE ANN. § 13-8-50 (West 2011).
133 La Calhene, Inc. v. Spolyar, 938 F. Supp. 523, 526 (1996).
134
Kristen Doerer, What You Should Know About Noncompete
Agreements,
PBS
(July
14,
2016
6:11
PM),
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/economy/know-non-compete-agreements.
135
Noncompete Reform Continues in New England: Maine, New
Hampshire, and Rhode Island All Pass New Laws, FISHER PHILLIPS: NONCOMPETE
&
TRADE
SECRETS
BLOG
(July
17,
2019),
https://www.fisherphillips.com/Non-Compete-and-Trade-Secrets/noncompetereform-continues-in-new-england-maine (reporting that Massachusetts,
Maine, New Hampshire, and Rohde Island recently passed laws to prohibit
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California,136 Illinois,137 and Oregon.138 It does not mean that CNCs are
strictly voided in these states,139 but rather less likely enforceable. By
contrast, some states have “pro-CNC” statutes that authorize the use of
CNCs, such as Massachusetts,140 Michigan,141 North Carolina,142 and
Texas.143 However, these statutes set restrictions in drafting CNCs 144 or
do not guarantee the enforceability of CNCs in courts.145 Moreover,
despite the statutes that protect employers in Michigan, Michigan state
courts disfavor CNCs.146 In other states (e.g., New York) without statutes
to void CNCs, the courts may still reject CNCs for the considerations of
public policies.147
2.

Non-Disclosure Agreements

enforcing CNCs against low-wage employees). See also Barnett & Sichelman,
supra note 90, at 3 (“[S]everal state legislatures have enacted laws or are
considering enacting laws to prohibit or restrict noncompetes.”).
136 See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE. §16600 (West 2020) (“Except as
provided in this chapter, every contract by which anyone is restrained from
engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind is to that extent
void.”); CAL. LAB. CODE § 2802 (West 2016); Ixchel Pharma, LLC v. Biogen Inc.,
Civ. No. 2:17-00715, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13548, at *12–13 (Jan 25, 2018)
(prohibiting non-compete agreements for unfair competition under antitrust
law).
137 See 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 90/10 (2017).
138 See OR. REV. STAT § 653.295 (2019).
139 See, e.g., Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 189 P.3d 285, 289–90 (Cal.
2008) (permitting CNCs as exceptions of §16600 if reasonableness is
established). See also Gilson, supra note 41, at 607–09 (noting that there could
be cases allowing CNCs in California, even though CNCs are commonly not
applicable in California).
140 MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 149 § 24L (2018).
141 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.774a (West 1985).
142 N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4 (West 2005).
143 TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50 (West 2009).
144
See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.149, § 24L (West 2018). The
statutes in Massachusetts establish minimum standards for valid and
enforceable CNCs.
145 For example, Massachusetts courts do not consistently enforce CNCs.
See Gilson, supra note 41, at 603–07 (discussing the inconsistent application
of CNCs in Massachusetts, where the courts favor CNCs in general).
146 See, e.g., Huron Tech. Corp. v. Sparling, No. 316133, 2014 Mich. App.
LEXIS 1675, at *6 (Mich. App. Sep. 11, 2014) (rejecting enforcement of the
CNC because it is unreasonably broad).
147 See, e.g., Shearson Lehman Bros. Holdings, Inc. v. Schmertzler, 500
N.Y.S.2d 512, 513 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (“[A] covenant given by an employee
that he will not compete with his employer has been regarded much more
strictly because of the powerful considerations of public policy which militate
against sanctioning the loss of a man’s livelihood . . . .”).
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In addition to CNCs, NDAs are another common measure to
prevent and deter employees from disclosing confidential information to
outsiders.148 In employment relationships, NDAs—or confidentiality
agreements—establish confidential responsibilities. Today, employment
contracts usually include confidential provisions.149 In other words,
NDAs are usually signed at the beginning of establishing employment
relationships. As a result, if the research is conducted during the
employment, research results are confidential under NDAs regardless of
when a research idea is generated.
Similar to CNCs on prohibiting employee mobility, NDAs are
also a double-edged sword in innovation. On the one hand, NDAs crush
startup competitors and deter competitors from hiring their employees or
acquiring their confidential information.150 On the other hand, NDAs
deter companies from hiring talented employees from their competitors.151
Compared to CNCs, NDAs are more closely related to trade secret
law. The foundation of trade secret protection in trade secret law is the
privacy or confidentiality of trade secrets.152 Holmes suggested that if a
company cannot contain its technical information secret, trade secret law
does not prohibit employees from revealing the information to others.153
Samuelson followed Holmes and suggested that the nature of trade secret
law is about “breach of confidence or use of improper means to obtain a
trade secret.”154
NDAs, however, do not necessarily create enforceable trade
secrets.155 First, NDAs may not be binding if the confidential information

Epstein & Levi, supra note 70, at 905.
Orly Lobel, Symposium Keynote: The DTSA and the New Secrecy
Ecology, 1 BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & TAX L. REV. 369, 377 (2017).
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 See, e.g., E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d
1012, 1014–17 (5th Cir. 1970) (excluding a concern of breach of confidence for
policy reasons, such as promoting innovation). See also Bone, supra note 21,
at 297.
153 E. I. Du Pont De Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102–
03 (1917).
154
Pamela Samuelson, Information as Property: Do Ruckelshaus and
Carpenter Signal a Changing Direction in Intellectual Property Law?, 38 CATH.
U. L. REV. 365, 374–75 (1989).
155 See Sharon K. Sandeen, A Contract by Any Other Name Is Still a
Contract: Examining the Effectiveness of Trade Secret Clauses to Protect
Databases, 45 IDEA 119, 124 (2005) (“A trade secret cannot be created by
contract.”).
148
149
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does not constitute a trade secret.156 If NDAs are not clear about what
information is confidential, employers still lose their cases claiming
breaches of confidentiality.157 Scholars constantly criticize that NDAs
could be interpreted too narrowly to get enforced and protect companies
when courts only rely on common law.158 Moreover, there are
uncertainties that courts enforce or reject NDAs for policy reasons.159 The
policy reasons include, but are not limited to, promoting innovation and
creation, reducing precaution costs, protecting privacy, and enforcing
“standards of commercial ethics.”160 The failures of enforcing NDAs
could constitute “security lapses,” which result in failures to enforce trade
secrets.161
In addition to NDAs, labor law and human capital law may
function similarly to NDAs by strengthening the control of companies
over the innovative contributions made by employees. Under the
California Labor Code, employers can claim property rights on whatever
employees produce in their employment due to the resources of the
employers.162 In American Alloy Steel Corp. v. Ross, the court ruled that
trade secrets and confidential information, including the knowledge of
employees obtained in these measures, are properties owned by
employers.163 Employees can use other information only after the
termination of employment.164 Companies do not hold property rights

156 See id. at 143 (“Where information is not a trade secret but constitutes
confidential or proprietary information, it is argued that a party who
contractually agrees to maintain the confidentiality of such information is
bound to honor the contract.”).
157 Epstein & Levi, supra note 70, at 905.
158 Risch, supra note 72, at 41.
159
See Edmund W. Kitch, The Law and Economics of Rights in Valuable
Information, 9 J. LEG. STUD. 683, 689–90 (1980) (“Courts will accept these
[confidentiality] agreements as evidence that the firm valued the information
and attempted to preserve its secrecy, but they decide for themselves whether
the information should actually be protected.”).
160 See Bone, supra note 21, at 297. See also E. I. du Pont de Nemours &
Co., 431 F.2d at 1016–17; Judge Richard Posner, Note, Trade Secret
Misappropriation: A Cost-Benefit Response to the Fourth Amendment Analogy,
106 HARV. L. REV. 461, 470–71 (1992).
161 Epstein & Levi, supra note 70, at 898.
162 CAL. LAB. CODE § 2860 (West 1988) (“Everything which an employee
acquires by virtue of his employment, except the compensation which is due to
him from his employer, belongs to the employer, whether acquired lawfully or
unlawfully, or during or after the expiration of the term of his employment.”).
163 Am. Alloy Steel Corp. v. Ross, 308 P.2d 494, 496–97 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1957).
164 Id.
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over the technical information165 produced by employees but acquire
property rights when the information constitutes trade secrets, which are
kept in confidential and exclusive use.166 Moreover, based on Bd. of Trs.
of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys.,167 scholars
like Lobel believe that employment relationships suggest a default and
constant transfer of title of inventions from employees to employers.168
B.

Trade Secret Law

The standard of trade secret protection widely accepted by most
states originated from common law169 and was formally added in the
Restatement (First) of Torts in 1939.170 This standard is substantially
identical to the definition of trade secrets and the rules in the UTSA,171
which the Uniform Law Commission sketched as statutory law in 1979.172
In practice, empirical evidence showed that state courts often cite the

165 See Risch, supra note 72, at 14. See also E. I. Du Pont de Nemours
Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917).
166 See Carpenter v. U.S., 484 U.S. 19, 25–27 (1987).
167 563 U.S. 776, 779 (2011) (holding that employers are assignees and
owners of patents produced by using the sources of employers).
168 See Orly Lobel, The New Cognitive Property: Human Capital Law and
the Reach of Intellectual Property, 93 TEX. L. REV. 789, 815 (2015) (“The
‘automatic assignment’ adopted by the Supreme Court has meant that an
employment or assignment agreement signed at the beginning of employment
automatically transfers title to the employer, with no further act of transfer
required once those inventions are conceived and come into existence.”).
169 See Brittany S. Bruns, Criticism of the Defend Trade Secrets Act of
2016: Failure to Preempt, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 469, 473 (2017). See also
Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 425 (Mass. 1868); Bone, supra note 21, at 251–
59 (introducing how people and courts solve trade secret issues under propertybased theory before the formation of the concept of trade secret and a separate
trade secret law). Bone argues that trade secret protection discussed in
Schiller’s Article and the Roman Law is very different from today’s trade secret
law, so we do not trace the history of trade secret law to the Roman Law. But
see A. Arthur Schiller, Trade Secrets and the Roman Law: The Actio Servi
Corrupti, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 837 (1930), in A. ARTHUR SCHILLER, AN AMERICAN
EXPERIENCE IN ROMAN LAW 1 (1971) (discussing the trade secret protection
under the Roman Law).
170 See Victoria A. Cundiff, Maximum Security: How to Prevent Departing
Employees from Putting Your Trade Secrets to Work for Your Competitors, 8
SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L. J. 301, 304 (1992).
171 See id. at 305 (introducing the definition of a trade secret in the UTSA,
which is similar to the Restatement (Frist) of Torts). See generally Roman A.
Klitzke, The Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 64 MARQ. L. REV. 277 (1980).
172 See Bruns, supra note 169, at 475.
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UTSA but rarely cite Restatement (First) of Torts in trade secret
disputes.173
All of the states, excluding North Carolina and New York, have
voluntarily enacted the UTSA as of January 2020 to address trade secret
protection,174 rather than merely apply common law.175 Even though the
Uniform Law Commission does not list North Carolina as a state enacting
the UTSA,176 its trade secret law is close to the UTSA.177 The trade secret
law in New York also moves towards the UTSA.178
At the federal level, the DTSA enables civil claims for trade secret
misappropriations to be a federal question of law since 2016.179 It
substantively aligns with the UTSA.180 Therefore, trade secret law in this
Article refers to how state courts and federal courts apply the UTSA, the
DTSA, and relevant case law dealing with trade secret protection.181
In theory, scholars suggest that trade secret law is an efficient
substitute for contractual and physical restrictions in trade secret
protection.182 First, trade secret law is consistent with tort theories to deter

173
David S. Almeling et al., A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret
Litigation in State Courts, 46 GONZ. L. REV. 57, 61 (2011) (“Only 5% of the cases
[between 1995–2009] cited the Restatement (First) of Torts.”).
174
See UNIF. TRADE SECRET ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985),
https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/communityhome?CommunityKey=3a2538fb-e030-4e2d-a9e2-90373dc05792 (last visited
May 14, 2020).
175 See Almeling et al., supra note 173, at 76 (showing that most states
that used common law were the states had not adopted the UTSA).
176
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985),
https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/communityhome?CommunityKey=3a2538fb-e030-4e2d-a9e2-90373dc05792 (last visited
May 14, 2020).
177 See SBUBHA GHOSH ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PRIVATE RIGHTS,
THE PUBLIC INTEREST, AND THE REGULATION OF CREATIVE ACTIVITY 10 (3rd ed.,
2016).
178 Two bills were introduced in 2019 and proposed to adopt the UTSA.
See H.R. 1657, 116th Cong. (2019); H.R. 2468, 116th Cong. (2019).
179 See Linton, supra note 14, at 8 (“The DTSA creates a federal civil cause
of action for trade secret misappropriation.”). Before the DTSA, only criminal
claims for trade secret espionage qualified as a federal question under the
Economic Espionage Act (EEA). Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104–294, 110 Stat. 3488 (1996).
180 See Joseph P. Fishman & Deepa Varadarajan, Similar Secrets, 167 U.
PA. L. REV. 1051, 1062 (2019). See also Sharon K. Sandeen & Christopher B.
Seaman, Toward a Federal Jurisprudence of Trade Secret Law, 32 BERKELEY
TECH. L. J. 829, 865–66 (2017); Lobel, supra note 149, at 380–81.
181
This Article does not address unfair competition legislation with
respect to trade secret protection in the context of employment relationships.
182 See Lemley, supra note 28, at 313.
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wrongful acts conducted by employees.183 Second, trade secret law avoids
overinvestment in secret protection by companies.184 Third, it is also
inefficient to frequently sue for CNCs or NDAs.185 When courts hesitate
to enforce contractual restrictions on employees, scholars suggest that
companies should rely on trade secret law.186 Moreover, applying
common law to trade secret issues has a deficiency that courts do
recognize the value of trade secrets, which is the secrecy itself.187
Under trade secret law, the primary test for bringing a civil claim
of pursuing trade secret protection requires that a plaintiff establishes: (1)
the existence of a trade secret; and (2) a misappropriation of the trade
secret.188 These two elements summarize the common rules in the
Restatement (First) of Torts,189 the UTSA,190 and the DTSA.191 In a broad
sense, these three laws provide consistent definitions of trade secrets and
misappropriations.192 However, the two elements are applied with
variations and uncertainties by state courts and federal courts when they
apply the UTSA and the DTSA.193
In order to establish the first element, a trade secret should be
novel, have independent economic value, and be maintained secretly with
reasonable efforts.194 With respect to the standard of independent
Id. at 319.
Id. at 334–35.
185 See Gilson, supra note 41, at 609.
186 See Levine & Sichelman, supra note 27, at 767 (“[T]rade secrets and
patents can be used to mimic the preclusive effects of noncompetition
agreements by creating significant penalties for bringing proprietary
information to a new employer.”); Barnett & Sichelman, supra note 90, at 9 (“A
firm may use patents to protect against knowledge leakage through employee
movement.”).
187 See Risch, supra note 72, at 38, 41 (arguing that common law fails to
create liabilities in all cases).
188 See Sandeen, supra note 155, at 126–27.
189 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS §§ 757–59 (Am. Law Inst. 1939).
190 UNIF. TRADE SECRET ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985).
191 Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, 18 U.S.C. § 1836 (West 2016).
192 See generally Bruns, supra note 169 (discussing the uniformity and
inconsistency of the DTSA and how states adopt the UTSA with variations).
193 See generally id.
194 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3) (2016).
183
184

[T]he term “trade secret” means all forms and types of
financial, business, scientific, technical, economic, or
engineering information, including patterns, plans,
compilations,
program
devices,
formulas,
designs,
prototypes, methods, techniques, processes, procedures,
programs, or codes, whether tangible or intangible, and
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economic value, Johnson summarized five tests adopted by courts,
uniformly suggesting that a trade secret has “transferable and objective
positive value.”195 With respect to novelty or the scope of trade secret
protection, the UTSA and DTSA definition of a trade secret excludes the
information “generally known” or “readily ascertainable” to others.196
Nevertheless, this definition is still broad.197 It could protect information
that is not in continuous commercial use as trade secrets.198 When states
enact the UTSA, the definition of a trade secret may be further broadened.
For example, the California UTSA (CUTSA) definition of a trade secret is
broader than the UTSA,199 as the CUTSA excludes the “readily
ascertainable” restriction.200

whether or how stored, compiled, or memorialized physically,
electronically, graphically, photographically, or in writing
if . . . the owner thereof has taken reasonable measures to
keep such information secret; and . . . the information derives
independent economic value, actual or potential, from not
being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable
through proper means by, another person who can obtain
economic value from the disclosure or use of the information.
Id. See UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985).
“Trade secret” means information, including a formula,
pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or
process, that . . . derives independent economic value, actual
or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being
readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who
can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and . . .
is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the
circumstances to maintain its secrecy.
Id. See also Buffets, Inc. v. Klinke, 73 F.3d 965, 967-68 (9th Cir. 1996).
195 Eric E. Johnson, Trade Secret Subject Matter, 33 HAMLINE L. REv. 545,
547 (2010).
196
See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(B) (2016); UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT
§ 1(4)(i) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985).
197 See Charles Tait Graves & Elizabeth Tippett, UTSA Preemption and
the Public Domain: How Courts Have Overlooked Patent Preemption of State
Law Claims Alleging Employee Wrongdoing, 65 RUTGERS L. REV. 59, 97–101
(2012); Bruns, supra note 169, at 481–82 (arguing that the DTSA definition of
a trade secret is close to the UTSA definition of a trade secret).
198 See Johnson, supra note 195, at 563.
199 Bruns, supra note 169, at 478–79.
200 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(d) (West 2012). See also Abba Rubber Co. v.
Seaquist, 286 Cal. Rptr. 518, 528 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (“[W]hether a fact is
‘readily ascertainable’ is not part of the definition of a trade secret in
California.”).
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In high-technology industries, however, the scope of an applicable
trade secret may be relatively narrow.201 Courts may dismiss a trade secret
case for the plaintiff’s failure to identify the alleged trade secret under
either the UTSA or the DTSA, regardless of which claim is raised by the
plaintiff.202 Moreover, “pre-conception inventions” are excluded from
being entitled to trade secret protection.203 Trade secret law is hardly
enforced against intangible spillovers.204 Besides high-technology
industries, there are also “odd cases” applying a narrow definition of trade
secrets.205 For example, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied
trade secret protection for literary works based on lack of novelty and nonobviousness,206 which are the requirements for patent protection.207
Moreover, in the employment context, courts may define trade
secrets narrowly for public policies.208 The Restatement (First) of Torts
states that “[m]atters of public knowledge or of general knowledge in an
industry cannot be appropriated by one as his secret.”209 Courts and
scholars also uniformly agree that general skills, education, abilities, and
experience of employees, probably trained by employers, are not trade
secrets.210 The uncertainty of the boundary of this exclusion is that courts
do not clearly understand what constitutes the unprotectable “general
knowledge, skill, and experience” (“KSE”), resulting in inconsistent
decisions.211
201
Camilla A. Hrdy, The General Knowledge, Skill, and Experience
Paradox, 60 B.C. L. REV. 2409, 2466–71 (2019) (citing cases decided in
California, Florida, and New York in which courts applied a “particularity”
requirement and rejected to apply broad trade secret protection against
employees).
202 See, e.g., Mission Measurement Corp. v. Blackbaud, Inc., 216 F. Supp.
3d 915, 920 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (citing Illinois UTSA to reject the plaintiff’s DTSA
claim); Lobel, supra note 168, at 810–11 (discussing same).
203 See SI Handling Sys., Inc. v. Heisley, 753 F.2d 1244, 1266 (3rd Cir.
1985).
204 See Gilson, supra note 41, at 578.
205 Jay Dratler, Jr., Trade Secrets in the United States and Japan: A
Comparison and Prognosis, 14 YALE J. INT’L L. 68, 102 n. 140 (1989).
206 See Walker v. Univ. Books, Inc., 602 F.2d 859, 865 (9th Cir. 1979)
(supporting the district court that denied trade secret protection due to the
“both vague and obvious” information).
207 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102–03.
208 See generally Hrdy, supra note 201.
209 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939).
210
See generally Robert Unikel, Bridging the “Trade Secret” Gap:
Protecting “Confidential Information” Not Rising to the Level of Trade Secrets,
29 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 841 (1998) (trying to draw a boundary between
“unprotectable ‘general skill and knowledge’” and “protectable ‘trade secrets’”).
211 See generally Hrdy, supra note 201.
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Therefore, legal professions constantly recommend the use of
NDAs to companies in information disclosure.212 Signing NDAs
explicitly establishes the knowledge about the existence of trade secrets.213
NDAs are referenced by federal courts to determine whether companies
adopt reasonable measures of trade secret protection.214 However,
confidential information does not necessarily qualify as enforceable trade
secrets.215 NDAs are neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for
showing the existence of trade secrets.216 Moreover, NDAs aggravate
rather than eliminate the uncertainties about whether a duty of
confidentiality is breached.217
With respect to the second element, in short, misappropriations
refer to the disclosure or the use of the trade secrets that are acquired by
improper means without consent from their holders.218 Courts need only

212 See, e.g., Epstein & Levi, supra note 70, at 904–05; Cundiff, supra note
170, at 309.
213 See Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369, 373 (7th Cir. 1953).
214
David S. Almeling et al., A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret
Litigation in Federal Courts, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 291, 294 (2010).
215 Bernier v. Merrill Air Eng’rs, 770 A.2d 97, 107 (Me. 2001) (affirming
a breach of contract but denying trade secret misappropriation because the
information lacks economic value). Risch cited this case to distinguish common
law from trade secret law. See Risch, supra note 72, at 38.
216 See Risch, supra note 72, at 38.; Sandeen, supra note 155, at 140
(“[W]hile a confidentiality agreement is some evidence of reasonable efforts, it
is not determinative of the issue); Johnson, supra note 195, at 566 (“A trade
secret is not a heap of confidential information.”).
217 See Bone, supra note 21, at 276–77 (arguing that trade secret law
leads thieves to invest in concealing, which increases the investigation costs of
trade secret owners).
218 UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985).

“Misappropriation” means: (i) acquisition of a trade secret of
another by a person who knows or has reason to know that
the trade secret was acquired by improper means; or (ii)
disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express
or implied consent by a person who (A) used improper means
to acquire knowledge of the trade secret; or (B) at the time of
disclosure or use knew or had reason to know that his
knowledge of the trade secret was (I) derived from or through
a person who has utilized improper means to acquire it; (II)
acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to
maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or (III) derived from or
through a person who owed a duty to the person seeking relief
to maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or (C) before a
material change of his position, knew or had reason to know
that it was a trade secret ad that knowledge of it had been
acquired by accident or mistake.
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to check the second element when plaintiffs show that there is a valid trade
secret. “Improper means” include, but are not limited to, criminal and
tortious behaviors,219 such as breaches of an obligation of
confidentiality.220
“Improper means” can be established against
employees who derive the information through the employers if they own
the obligation, even though the employees acquire technical information
by employers’ voluntarily training.221 The obligation of confidentiality
can be either explicit in a contract or implicit by duty.222 However, this
obligation can be waived under public policies, such as fair competition
and the freedom of employee mobility.223 Moreover, the second element
is restrictively applicable when courts recognize a piece of information as
a valid and enforceable trade secret.224
Some states allow companies to tackle a “threatened
misappropriation” under the IDD,225 which is embedded in the UTSA.
The UTSA broadly indicates that “[a]ctual or threatened misappropriation
may be enjoined.”226 The DTSA also adopts this rationale completely.227

Id.
219 Besides the listed criminal and tortious behaviors in the UTSA and
the DTSA, a behavior that is “not itself a crime, a tort, or a breach of contract”
may constitute an improper means. See Sandeen & Seaman, supra note 180,
at 908. See also E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012
(5th Cir. 1970).
220
UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2)(ii)(B)(III) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N
1985).
221 UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(1) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985).
222 See Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369, 373 (7th Cir. 1953).

[T]he Supreme Court of Pennsylvania painted, in broad
strokes, the general picture of a claim of this nature, holding
the essential elements to be: (1) existence of a trade secret,
(2) communicated to the defendant (3) while he is in a
position of trust and confidence and (4) use by the defendant
to the injury of the plaintiff. This, then, is our broad basis for
decision.
Id. See also Lemley, supra note 28, at 318 (listing obligations of protecting
trade secrets which can be explicit by contracts or implicit by duty).
223 See Hrdy, supra note 201, at 2413 n.27.
224
See generally id. at 2433–34 (discussing the scope of trade secret
protection).
225 Randall E. Kahnke et al., Doctrine of Inevitable Disclosure, FAEGRE &
BENSON
1
(Sept.
2008),
https://www.faegrebd.com/webfiles/Inevitable%20Disclosure.pdf.
226 UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 2(a) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985).
227 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(A)(i) (West 2016).
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An “inevitable disclosure” refers to “the threat that an employer’s trade
secrets will be misappropriated during the course of the employee’s
subsequent employment.”228 Therefore, without actual harms, courts may
still grant injunctions against threatened harms or to restrict employee
mobility by applying the IDD.229
The IDD’s application in trade secret protection, however, is
controversial and often connected with the controversially-applied
CNCs.230 The IDD’s application is affected by public policies with respect
to employee mobility and the freedom of employment.231 The most
influential case in which the court adopted the IDD is PepsiCo v.
Redmond.232 After this case, “[t]wenty-one American jurisdictions have
recognized the [IDD].”233 Even though some states adopt the IDD, the
IDD is restrictedly applied by courts, such as in Missouri234 and New
Jersey.235 Moreover, the IDD is inconsistently applied in some states, such
as Florida, Indiana, and Illinois. 236 Appendix lists the adoption of the IDD
and its consistency with CNCs and the IDD by states in detail, suggesting
controversies across and within states.
IV. Risks of Disclosing Technical Information in Employment
Relationships
Companies have marginal costs of information disclosure
resulting from employee mobility or betrayal. The literature about

228 Ryan M. Wiesner, A State-By-State Analysis of Inevitable Disclosure:
A Need for Uniformity and a Workable Standard, 16 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L.
REV. 211, 228 (2012).
229 See, e.g., PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 46 F.3d 29 (7th Cir. 1995).
230 M. Claire Flowers, Facing the Inevitable: The Inevitable Disclosure
Doctrine and the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
2207, 2217 (Fall 2018).
231 Eleanore R. Godfrey, Inevitable Disclosure of Trade Secrets: Employee
Mobility v. Employer’s Rights, 3 J. HiGH TECH. L. 161, 167 (2004).
232 See Redmond, 46 F.3d at *29.
233
Allot Commc’ns., Ltd. v. Cullen, No. 10-E-0016, 2010 N.H. Super.
LEXIS 11, at *7 (N.H. Super. Ct. Feb. 7, 2010).
234 See H & R Block E. Tax Servs., Inc. v. Enchura, 122 F. Supp. 2d 1067,
1074 (W.D. Mo. 2000).
235 There is an inconsistency in between the application of IDDs by the
3rd Circuit and New Jersey state courts. Compare Cont’l Group, Inc. v. Amoco
Chems. Corp., 614 F.2d 351, 356 (3d Cir. 1980) (rejecting threatened
misappropriation), with Nat’l Starch & Chem. Corp. v. Parker Chem. Corp.,
530 A.2d 31, 33 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) (protecting threatened
misappropriation).
236 Wiesner, supra note 228, at 219–21.

35

2020

JUDICAL REWARD ALLOCATION

261

employee turnover discusses the value of employees and their knowledge
as assets.237 There is some technical information accessible to both
employees and the public, such as “general [KSE],” 238 the disclosure of
which does not increase the loss to the company holding the information.
However, when an employee leaves or betrays, the company loses this
employee as human capital and some technical information only held by
the employee. Meanwhile, employee mobility or betrayal may also result
in probable losses for disclosing some unpublished technical information
held by the company but accessible to the employee.
In conducting innovation and transmitting technical information
between the company and employees, the company bears disclosure risks,
and employees bear legal risks if information disclosure triggers legal
restrictions. The two types of risks and the probability of disclosing the
unpublished technical information can be reduced by physical or legal
restrictions placed by the company on employees. This Part explains the
risks and the company’s probable losses due to employee mobility or
betrayal and information disclosure, which can be reduced or prevented
by legal protection.
A.

Allocation of Disclosure Risks

Figure 2 maps different legal or physical measures of securing
technical information in two axes. A company’s disclosure risks are
depicted by the Y-axis. The X-axis depicts a departing, betrayal, or
reckless employee’s legal risks of disclosing the technical information
received, produced, or potentially produced in the company. The
employee has low legal risks if there are no enforceable legal restrictions
against information disclosure. By contrast, the company has high
disclosure risks if it expects to exclusively use unpublished technical
information. However, there may be no enforceable legal restrictions
against the disclosure of the information.

237 Urbancová Hana & Linhartová Lucie, Staff Turnover as a Possible
Threat to Knowledge Loss, 3 J. COMPETITIVENESS 84, 84 (2011).
238 See generally Hrdy, supra note 201.
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Figure 2. Risks Allocation by Legal Security Measures.239
In three circumstances, the company bears low disclosure risks.
First, the company may deny the employee access to unpublished technical
information by physical measures. Thus, the employee cannot disclose
the information that he has not learned. Second, the company may
voluntarily reveal the information to the public as patents (i.e., P1) or in
the public domain (i.e., D). Correspondingly, the employee does not bear
legal liabilities for the information disclosure. Third, the company may
have strong legal protection for the information, such as enforceable
NDAs, CNCs, or trade secrets under the UTSA, the DTSA, or the IDD. In
such a situation, the employee bears high legal risks for information
disclosure caused by him for his legal duties.
Broad trade secret law, such as the CUTSA and the IDD, reduces
disclosure risks borne by the company compared to average trade secret
law.240 The CUTSA enables trade secret protection for confidential

Wang, supra note 49.
See Risch, supra note 72, at 54 (suggesting that trade secret protection
in California is stronger than other states and reduces litigation costs and
litigation uncertainties).
239
240
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information readily ascertainable to the public.241 Moreover, compared to
the UTSA that may enjoin threatened misappropriations,242 the IDD and
the DTSA enjoin departing employees from threatened misappropriations,
broader than the UTSA’s fundamental protection scope.243 By contrast,
some courts that narrowly adopt the UTSA enjoin actual
misappropriations, as shown in Appendix. In such a circumstance, the
difficulties in enforcing a trade secret increase disclosure risks borne by
the company.
In contrast to the circumstances of imposing low disclosure risks
to the company, it bears high disclosure risks without any legal protection
or under ineffective legal protection. The company can establish fiduciary
duties against information disclosure by using CNCs, NDAs, or other
security measures. However, the fiduciary duties may not be properly or
effectively established.
The company bears high disclosure risks if it reveals information
to the employee but releases him from any fiduciary duties. First, it is
apparent that the employee does not bear any legal risks if the employee
does not own fiduciary duties to the company. Thus, when the employee
self-teaches the information without direct authorization of information
accessibility given by the company, the company fails to impose explicit
fiduciary duties on the employee. Second, CNCs and NDAs that are
signed by the employee but are ineffective and not enforceable do not
impose fiduciary duties successfully. Some states commonly do not
enforce CNCs for legislative restrictions (e.g., California).244 In such a
circumstance, the employee bears low legal risks for the information
disclosure solely governed by the unenforceable CNCs because the
employee knows that the signed CNC is very likely to be void. Some
states set strict thresholds for enforcing CNCs, such as time length and
geographical scope.245 Similarly, courts may refuse to enforce NDAs for
policy reasons,246 which results in high uncertainties about enforcing the
241
See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(d) (West 2012); Abba Rubber Co. v.
Seaquist, 286 Cal. Rptr. 518, 528 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
242 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(A) (2016); UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 2(a)
(UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985).
243 Kahnke et al., supra note 225, at 2.
244 See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE. § 16600 (Deering 1941); CAL. LAB.
CODE § 2802 (Deering 1937).
245
E.g., Boulanger v. Dunkin’ Donuts, Inc., 815 N.E.2d 572, 576–77
(Mass. 2004) (“A covenant not to compete is enforceable only if it is necessary
to protect a legitimate business interest, reasonably limited in time and space,
and consonant with the public interest.”).
246
See Kitch, supra note 159, at 689–90. See also discussion supra
Section II.A.
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signed NDAs and high disclosure risks. For instance, non-trade secret
confidential information addressed by NDAs may not be enforceable in
courts.247 If the NDAs are void, the employee, again, bears low legal risks
for the invalidity of the NDAs. Moreover, the company may not sign
adequate NDAs to effectively cover each unit of technical information that
the company is not ready to reveal to the public.248 Therefore, the
confidential information other than trade secrets imposes high risks borne
by the company and the employee. On the one hand, the confidential
information imposes fiduciary duties on the employee, suggesting high
legal risks if he reveals the information. On the other hand, the scope of
trade secrets is narrower than confidential information. The company may
believe that it holds “trade secrets,” which merely constitute confidential
information rather than enforceable trade secrets under trade secret law
(e.g., P3, P4, and P5). As a result, the company may lose the exclusive
rights over the information if courts refuse to protect the information under
trade secret law.
B.

Ineffectiveness of Legal Protection for Unpublished Technical
Information

The restrictions and uncertainties of the legal security measures
for prohibiting information disclosure suggest four reasons explaining that
the legal security measures cannot effectively protect unpublished
technical information. First, some types of secrets may not be enforceable
against employees under CNCs, NDAs, and trade secret law. The
contracts and trade secret law have various uncertain boundaries
depending on the technical information’s function and significance in
business. Second, courts may refuse to enforce secrets for policy reasons.
Third, some employees may process Phase I transactions of unpublished
information without the company’s knowledge, which may be outside of
the legal protection under contract law and trade secret law. Fourth, the
company may not know the existence of some knowledge only held by its
employees and cannot enforce its legal rights under contract law or trade
secret law. These four theoretical arguments about the ineffective legal
protection have been proved by Schmidt’s empirical evidence: knowledge
spillovers are inevitable regardless of trade secret protection.249
247 See Sandeen, supra note 155, at 143 (“Where information is not a trade
secret but constitutes confidential or proprietary information, it is argued that
a party who contractually agrees to maintain the confidentiality of such
information is bound to honor the contract.”).
248 See Epstein & Levi, supra note 70, at 898.
249 See generally Schmidt, supra note 26.
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Figure 3. Risks Allocation by Information Types.250
First, CNCs, NDAs, and trade secret law can conceal the
unpublished technical information deployed by a company in its firstgeneration products or production (i.e., P2). CNCs are confined to the
protection against the company’s competitors (i.e., P2 – P5, L, H1, H2). By
contrast, other types of unpublished technical information (i.e., the
technical information for developing the second-generation products P3,
deterring competitors P4, or being deposited P5) may not be enforceable
under trade secret law due to their hardship to establish the existence of
enforceable trade secrets. Trade secret law does not impose liabilities on
employees for all types of secrets. Moreover, CNCs cannot perfectly
conceal them, either, because these types of information can be more
attractive to non-competitors than competitors. In addition, NDAs
governing these types of information in confidential may not be
enforceable if there is a threshold of showing trade secrets for courts to

250

Wang, supra note 49.
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enforce the NDAs. NDAs are neither a sufficient nor a necessary
condition for establishing enforceable trade secrets.251
Second, courts give policy reasons to decline to enforce NDAs,
CNCs, and secrets.252 Knowledge spillovers are a public good, which can
be caused by information disclosure or employee mobility. 253 Thus, courts
may refuse to enforce fiduciary duties imposed in NDAs or under trade
secret law for knowledge spillovers and to promote social innovation.
Moreover, courts may decline to apply the IDD or enforce CNCs for the
same reason or the freedom of employment.254 By contrast, courts may
also enforce NDAs, CNCs, and secrets for other policy reasons, including
but not limited to promoting innovation and creation, reducing precaution
costs, protecting privacy, and enforcing “standards of commercial
ethics”.255 Taking NDAs as an example, Lobel suggests that NDAs are a
double-edged sword in innovation.256 On the one hand, NDAs crush
startup competitors and deter competitors from hiring employees of a
company or acquiring its confidential information.257 On the other hand,
NDAs deter the company from hiring talented employees from their
competitors.258 Overall, the uncertain policy reasons adopted by courts
may result in either ineffective or effective legal protection for all types of
unpublished technical information.
Third, contract law and trade secret law may not be effective to
protect unpublished technical information for information asymmetries,
which are discussed in Part II. Franco and Mitchell suggested that a
company is incapable in knowing how much employees exactly learn the
unpublished technical information held by the company.259 Other scholars
also broadly recognize the existence of information asymmetries.260 Even
though adequate NDAs may cover all the confidential information against
the employees who access the information with authorization, NDAs
cannot effectively impose fiduciary duties on the employees who self251 See Risch, supra note 72, at 6–8; Sandeen, supra note 155, at 125;
Johnson, supra note 195, at 551.
252 See, e.g., Shearson Lehman Bros. Holdings, Inc. v. Schmertzler, 166
A.D.2d 216 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986). See also Kitch, supra note 159, at 697.
253 Pace, supra note 117, at 441–42.
254 Godfrey, supra note 231, at 167.
255 Bone, supra note 21, at 250; Kitch, supra note 159, at 685.
256 Lobel, supra note 149, at 370.
257 Id. at 377.
258 Id.
259 Franco & Mitchell, supra note 60, at 603.
260 E.g., Png, supra note 25; Schwartz, supra note 31; Dass et al., supra
note 65, at 4 (suggesting that small firms suffer the information asymmetries
the most).
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teach the information without authorization. As a result, the company does
not have an enforceable NDA against the self-taught employees and may
lose the trade-secret information against any outsiders. Regardless of
whether or not there are enforceable CNCs and the unpublished technical
information is used by a direct competitor, knowledge spillovers created
by the employees at least result in deadweight losses for the company.
Fourth, NDAs, CNCs, or trade secret law is incapable of imposing
fiduciary duties on employees for the asymmetric information only held
by employees (i.e., L, H1, and H2). The company hardly knows the
information held only by employees (i.e., L, H1, H2)261 and to estimate the
information value.262 The employee inventor has the absolute control of
the technical information before the information is disclosed to the
company.263 Thus, the company is incapable of retrieving the information
unknown to it. Yeh argues that it usually takes a long time for companies
to realize that their trade secrets are misappropriated by (departing)
employees, which creates difficulties for companies to enforce trade secret
protection.264 However, companies suffer insuperable hardships for the
asymmetric information only held by employees. On the one hand, most
startups file patents to avoid trade secret litigations, suggested by the
empirical evidence of Shalem and Trajtenberg.265 On the other hand,
NDAs and trade secret law cannot be precautions against such a situation
for the failure of imposing fiduciary duties when companies do not control
the information. Even though courts recognize the property rights of
companies over the technical information developed by their R&D
investment, the companies should not pursue the rights under contract law
and trade secret law.266 Moreover, CNCs restricting employee mobility
prevent the information from being disclosed to competitors, but cannot
restrict departing employees from disclosing the information to others or
force the employees to transfer the information back to the company.
The company may be entitled to the property rights of the
asymmetric information under labor law, human capital law,267 or patent
See Schwartz, supra note 31.
See Png, supra note 25.
263 See generally Anton & Yao, supra note 17.
264 See YEH, supra note 18, at 13–14.
265 See Trajtenberg & Shalem, supra note 103, at 129.
266 See generally Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche
Molecular Sys., 563 U.S. 776, 792 (2011); Preston v. Marathon Oil Co., 684 F.3d
1276, 1288–89 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Anton & Yao, supra note 17; Lobel, supra note
149.
267
CAL. LAB. CODE § 2860 (2019) (“Everything which an employee
acquires by virtue of his employment, except the compensation which is due to
him from his employer, belongs to the employer, whether acquired lawfully or
261
262

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss2/5

42

268

PACE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 40.2

law, especially after the modern utilitarian law prevails Locke’s labor
theory that laborers own the property rights of what they produce, rather
than contract law or trade secret law.268 Thus, disclosing such asymmetric
information may increase legal risks associated with labor law or human
capital law rather than legal risks associated with contract law or trade
secret law. This increase is limited because employees can always argue
that the information is in the public domain (i.e., D). The startups funded
by departing employees (spin-outs) always file patents to prevent trade
secret legal issues raised by their previous employer.269 This consequence
of filing patents with the asymmetric information held by them increases
disclosure risks borne by the previous employer.
C.

Reduced Innovation Without Contracts and Trade Secret Law

The high risks of disclosing technical information by employees
borne by a company increase the company’s security costs in innovation
and deter its innovation. There are three ways to reduce the disclosure
risks without increasing the legal risks borne by employees. First, the
company can disregard CNCs, NDAs, and trade secret law to reduce the
disclosure risks. The cheapest way to reduce the disclosure risks is to
voluntarily reveal the information to the public for free. Then, the KSE of
employees are broadened for the open access to the information.
Moreover, the information then is contributed to the public domain (i.e.,
D) and spur social innovation as knowledge spillovers, regardless of
employee mobility. However, there is no control for the company if the
information is contributed to the public domain.270 The company may
suffer the loss of developing the information and do not sustain innovation.
A company hardly disclose its information to the public for free,
but it may generate more revenue for exclusively holding the information
(i.e., storing the information as P1 to P5).271 A reasonable information
holder maximizes its income received from the information.272 Legal
professions reminded that many industries profit from IP rights, rather than

unlawfully, or during or after the expiration of the term of his employment.”).
See also Am. Alloy Steel Corp. v. Ross, 308 P.2d 494, 497 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1957).
268 See generally LOCKE, supra note 83.
269 See Anton & Yao, supra note 84, at 192, 203 (reasoning as a result of
weak negotiation power owned by employees).
270 See Hall et al., supra note 16, at 376.
271 See generally Bhattacharya & Guriev, supra note 35. But see Schmidt,
supra note 26, at 7 (suggesting a marketing stunt for open innovation).
272 See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 55, at 12–13.

43

2020

JUDICAL REWARD ALLOCATION

269

merely products.273 Thus, to reduce disclosure risks, companies will
persist in securing the technical information in secrecy (i.e., P2 to P5)
against both the public and employees or under patents (i.e., P1) for
maintaining the exclusive rights. Both of the options are expensive, which
is supported by the literature introducing the efficiency of trade secret
law.274
Securing the information from employees, however, harms
innovation, which is opposed to the goal of trade secret law.275 When
reducing the disclosure risks, the company refuses to train employees in
KSE and strictly forbids employees from accessing the unpublished
technical information. The worst case is that the unused information (i.e.,
P3 to P5) does not generate imminent value and drops in deadweight losses
to both the company and the society. Therefore, scholars desire
developing trade secret law for increasing the training.276 However, the
literature stops at where employees can receive few additional KSE in such
a situation. The harm of strictly blocking information from employees
also includes limited innovation activities conducted by employees, low
innovation incentives of employees, and low employee stability and
loyalty. Employees can learn or acquire the unpublished information (i.e.,
P2 to P5) by self-teaching, suggesting a failure of reducing the disclosure
risks.
D.

Reduced Innovation Under Contracts and Trade Secret Law

A company can reduce its disclosure risks by relying on legal
security measures other than patent law, such as CNCs, NDAs, and trade
secret law. The legal security measures impose fiduciary duties on
employees, which increases legal risks borne by them. Shifting the
company’s disclosure risks to employees as legal risks is only effective
under a precondition that the contracts (i.e., CNCs and NDAs) or trade
secrets should be enforceable under the law. Otherwise, the legal risks
increase without a decrease in the disclosure risks. For example, even
though the company believes that it has trade secrets, the “trade secrets”
See Almeling, supra note 15, at 1104.
Filing patent applications is costly, and the information may not be
patentable. Moreover, the information’s R&D costs and patenting costs may
not be fully compensated by the 20-year patent protection. See e.g., Friedman
et al., supra note 22, at 65; Levine & Sichelman, supra note 27, at 755–70
(listing eight reasons for using trade secrets to substitute for patents); Lemley,
supra note 28, at 339–41. But see Bone, supra note 21, at 269, 271–77.
275
See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 489 (1974)
(encouraging companies to share information with employees).
276 E.g., Lemley, supra note 28. But see Bone, supra note 21, at 271.
273
274
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may probably not enforceable when lacking: (1) a narrow scope; (2)
economic value; (3) novelty; or (4) actual misappropriations.277
The increased legal risks borne by employees for reducing the
disclosure costs harm both the company’s innovation and social
innovation. Superficially, the high legal risks for fiduciary duties deter
employees from mobility, betrayal, or revealing confidential information
in other forms. Employees are prohibited from using the arguable
technical information (i.e., P2 to P5) after the employment or disclosing the
information to outsiders. Accordingly, the literature suggests that assured
exclusive rights induce large businesses to invest in R&D under the
sacrifice of entrepreneurship and innovation conducted by startups.278
As a result of the strong exclusive rights for the company
imposing strong fiduciary duties, however, employees may not have
incentives to learn or acquire the information from the company.
Moreover, under the high legal risks for information disclosure,
employees also have few incentives to transfer the information to the
employers if they are the controllers of the information (i.e., L, H1, and
H2), reducing Phase II transactions. The increased legal risks borne by
employees reduce the disclosure risks borne by the company by squeezing
the size of unpublished information (i.e., accumulated P2 to P5) learned,
used, or contributed by employees.
By contrast, employees have motivations to transfer their creative
technical information to outsiders279 and hide it from the company, even
though the company expects their loyalty.280
Employees have
expectations on their internal and external career path.281 However, their
intelligence and the technical information produced by their intelligence
have unbalanced values to the employees and the company. First,
information producers—employees value the technical information more
than the information receivers—the company.282 Second, the company
may undervalue the information.283 On the one hand, the value of the
technical information depends on how the company manipulates and
deploys the information in its business. 284 On the other hand, because of
the costs associated with training employees, the company pays relatively
See discussion supra Section II.B.
See Lobel, supra note 149, at 377 (arguing that DTSA that strengthens
trade secret protection has large harm effects on small firms).
279 See generally Trajtenberg & Shalem, supra note 103.
280 See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 28, at 335.
281 See Contigiani et al., supra note 30, at 2938.
282 Risch, supra note 72.
283 Png, supra note 25.
284 Lemley, supra note 28.
277
278
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lower wages to employees compared to their contribution to the
company.285 Third, outsiders may pay more to employees for the technical
information than the company or be more efficient to deploy or further
develop the information, which may drive employee mobility.286
Therefore, it is groundless to suggest that restricting information mobility
by trade secret law can promote the “esprit de corps” of companies.287 Png
suggested that employees always make tradeoffs between learning and
receiving payments.288 Based on the theory of Fosfuri and Rønde,
employee mobility is high if employees hold the technical information that
is valuable to second-stage products.289 Scholars also observed that in the
states without strong trade secret protection, companies increase salaries
or hire relatives for retaining employees.290
V. Balance the Enforcement of Contracts and Trade Secret
Law
According to the nexus between information management and
innovation in the use and enforcement of contracts and trade secret law,291
courts should find the balance between reducing the disclosure risks
resulted from employee mobility or betrayal and promoting innovation
invested by companies and conducted by employees or outsiders. When
courts and legislators support the legal security measures adopted by
companies, courts should foresee both a probable decrease in innovation
and the decreased knowledge spillovers for the strong exclusive rights
given to companies under contract law or trade secret law. This Article
argues that courts should narrowly enforce NDAs as consistent as the
scope of trade secret law but broaden the scope of trade secret protection
without a harm on employee loyalty. It is more efficient for innovation to
strengthen trade secret protection by adopting the IDD than enforcing
CNCs.
A.

Non-Disclosure Agreements

Barnett & Sichelman, supra note 90.
See YEH, supra note 18; Bhattacharya & Guriev, supra note 35;
Trajtenberg & Shalem, supra note 103.
287 Levine & Sichelman, supra note 27, at 768 (“[T]here is no doubt that
trade secrecy can serve such a purpose and thus help promote the esprit de
corps of a well-run startup.”).
288 Png, supra note 25.
289 Fosfuri & Ronde, supra note 31, at 46–47.
290 See Lippoldt & Schultz, supra note 64, at 9.
291 See discussion infra Part IV. See also discussion infra Sections V.C,
V.D.
285
286
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NDAs may not effectively reduce the disclosure risks borne by a
company because not all confidential information (i.e., P2 to P5) is
protectable under NDAs.292 Under ineffective NDAs, the disclosure risks
borne by the company and the legal risks of its employees are both high.
As Epstein & Levi reminded, while NDAs can deter information
disclosure by employees, NDAs can never be perfectly competent to
indicate and cover every unit of confidential information.293 The high dual
risks suggest high security costs for the company and harm the company’s
innovation, incentives of employees to improve their KSE, and social
innovation.
Courts can reject enforcement of NDAs or narrowly enforce
NDAs for encouraging knowledge spillovers and social innovation.
Instead, courts can enforce NDAs for protecting enforceable trade
secrets.294 Denials of NDAs are a utilitarian process for accumulating
knowledge spillovers. First, denials of NDAs filter out social deadweight
losses due to the information’s inefficient use by its owners from all the
confidential information (i.e., P2 to P5). Second, denials of NDAs allow
efficient use of the filtered information under competition.
B.

Trade Secret Law

The ineffectiveness of NDAs in trade secret protection can be
fixed by trade secret law.295 Courts do not enjoin a company from
enforcing NDAs for trade secrets.296 Moreover, inadequate NDAs that do
not thoroughly cover each unit of unpublished or confidential information,
but establish implicit fiduciary duties, may trigger the liability for trade
secret misappropriations. The trade secret information disclosed by bad
faith employees who self-learn the information is enforceable under trade
secret law.297
The strengthened protection under the UTSA and the DTSA
suggests an increase of security costs, which does not necessarily suggest
legal inefficiency. Statistics showed that NDAs are necessary but not

292 Sandeen, supra note 155, at 143 (suggesting that it is arguable about
whether or not confidential agreements are binding).
293 Epstein & Levi, supra note 70, at 900.
294 See, e.g., Sandeen, supra note 155, at 143.
295
See id. at 132 (suggesting the use of trade secrets to define the
boundary of confidential relationships).
296 Id. at 126–27.
297 See Lemley, supra note 28, at 318 (suggesting that the obligation of
trade secret protection is set either explicit by contracts or implicit by duty).
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sufficient to establish the element of reasonable efforts in federal courts,298
while it is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for establishing
trade secrets according to the UTSA.299 The company also needs other
physical security measures to show reasonable efforts for protecting
confidential technical information (i.e., P2 to P5) as trade secrets, while the
security does not need to be perfect.300 These physical security measures
do not strictly prohibit employees from accessing the information, but
allow them to use the information due to the legal protection. The
information’s economic value should offset security costs for the company
but required by law, so trade secret protection is still efficient for the
company. Otherwise, the company pursues patents for protecting the
information, or disposes it in the public domain.301
Trade secret law supplementing NDAs, however, shrinks the
scope of information protection. Confidential technical information
addressed in NDAs (i.e., P2 to P5) may not be entitled to trade secret
protection for lack of novelty or independent economic value. For
example, confidential information readily ascertainable to the public is not
novel and not entitled to trade secret protection in some states other than
California.302 Broad trade secret protection, such as the CUTSA and the
IDD, narrows the gap between the scope of trade secret law-protectable
information and the scope of confidential technical information (i.e., P2 to
P5). Broad trade secret protection fixes some ineffective or unenforceable
NDAs, and strong trade secret law can reduce the company’s disclosure
losses and disclosure risks. As a result, broad trade secret law and strong
trade secret protection function as rewards for the company to train
employees and may further improve the company’s R&D investment.303
It is reasonable that most scholars support the relief of novelty
requirements for trade secret protection.304 Without communicating the
Almeling et al., supra note 214, at 294.
See Risch, supra note 72; Sandeen, supra note 155, at 140; Johnson,
supra note 195, at 566.
300 See Lemley, supra note 28, at 325.
301 See generally Schmidt, supra note 26.
302
See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1 (West 2012); ABBA Rubber Co. v.
Seaquist, 286 Cal. Rptr. 518, 528–29 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
303 Compare Lemley, supra note 28, at 313 (arguing that trade secret
protection encourages information disclosure to employees), with Bone, supra
note 21, at 271 (expressing doubt about how trade secret law can promote
information disclosure).
304 See e.g., Pamela Passman et al., Economic Impact of Trade Secret
Theft: A Framework for Companies to Safeguard Trade Secrets and Mitigate
Potential Threats, CTR. RESPONSIBLE ENTERPRISE & TRADE (2014). See also
Vincent Chiappetta, Myth, Chameleon or Intellectual Property Olympian? A
Normative Framework Supporting Trade Secret Law, 8 GEO. MASON L. REV. 69,
298
299
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confidential information to outsiders, the company has difficulties in
evaluating both the novelty and the economic value of its unpublished
technical information. R&D activities conducted within the company form
the information.305 If the company is less confident on the long-term value
of the information—especially the information potentially being used in
production (i.e., P2 and P3)—the company is more likely to disclose the
information in a patent application (i.e., P1 or D).306 Then, the security
costs for the company are reduced, and the public benefits from the
knowledge spillovers. This argument about the novelty requirement in
trade secret law supplements the literature about IP strategies for
protecting innovative information under patents or trade secrets.307
Companies that try to enforce trade secrets unevenly understand
that innovation is a process of exchanging information in Phase I and
Phase II, and between insiders and outsiders.308 Myopic companies are
conditioned to exchange information in employee training (i.e., Phase I
transaction) by trade secret protection,309 but ignore Phase II transactions
and the benefits of knowledge spillovers that are contributed by outsiders.
Economists criticized the mixed use of NDAs and trade secrets for
the public interest.310 NDAs are ex ante without knowing the information
value, which may not fairly compensate inventor employees.311 However,
trade secret law protecting innovative and valuable information does not
give the employees a second chance to renegotiate with companies.312
Weak negotiation powers on the side of employees discourage Phase II
information transactions and expand information asymmetries.313 The
literature also reminds the risks that strong trade secret law (e.g., the IDD)
may harm competition.314 For example, companies may abuse it to sue
73 (1999).
305 See Sandeen, supra note 155, at 142 (suggesting that economic value
of the information may not be defined in a short term but instead varies by the
user of the information).
306 See Schmidt, supra note 26, at 3, 7 (arguing for the publishment of
technical information for free).
307 See, e.g., Michael R. McGurk & Jia W. Lu, The Intersection of Patents
and Trade Secrets, 7 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L. J. 189, 205 (2015) (comparing
between trade secrets or patents strategically).
308 See Ritala et al., supra note 78, at 22.
309 See id.
310 See Anton & Yao, supra note 84, at 203.
311 See id.
312 See id.
313 See id. at 192.
314 See Sandeen, supra note 155, at 154 (citing the IP theory discussed by
Justice Scalia). See also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S.
205, 214 (2000) (discussing the possibility of over-protection for intellectual
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departing employees to restrain competitions with startups rather than
repair harms caused by trade secret misappropriations.315
Relatively inessential, some scholars encourage courts to shrink
the scope of trade secret protection further for protecting employees. For
example, Hrdy suggested that courts should enforce or reject trade secrets
by an employee-oriented measure that the KSE of talented employees are
not treated as trade secrets.316 She inherited Turner’s suggestion that
personal KSE are not trade secrets, regardless of their value and secrecy
status.317 Giving property rights of the information or knowledge that
employees know of, but is invested by companies to employees, only
increases the transaction costs in Phase I and induces Phase II knowledge
transactions.318 Renegotiations between companies and employees may
not be activated if employees hold property rights. Recall the failure of
Locke’s labor theory in this utilitarian IP world.319 The key in determining
trade secret scope by courts is not to assign property rights of technical
information to employees or companies but rather to allocate the efficient
deployer of the information between the companies and outsiders (e.g.,
competitors or spin-out start-ups). With a presumption of the freedom of
employment, enforcing trade secrets is a balance between the deadweight
losses and marginal gains for companies and the marginal costs of
duplicate innovation for outsiders that departing employees join.320
Outsiders may deploy the information more efficiently than the companies
originating the information (e.g., P4 or P5). Lemley relied on the Arrow’s
information paradox and suggested this possibility. 321 He also suggested
that eliminating the secrets that exist only for legal protection can reduce
social costs.322 Moreover, he reminded courts that trade secret owners
might not be first movers but only have the possibility of becoming first
property rights).
315 See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974). See
also Bone, supra note 21, at 279.
316 See Hrdy, supra note 201, at 2463–64.
317
See id. at 2449. See also AMEDEE E. TURNER, THE LAW OF TRADE
SECRETS 115–72 (1962).
318 See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules,
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV.
1089 (1972).
319 See generally LOCKE, supra note 82. But see Lemley, supra note 28
(categorizing trade secrets as IP rights); Gordon, supra note 83, at 1608
(criticizing Locke’s theory and the interests of individuals in innovation).
320 See Risch, supra note 72, at 38 (arguing that there are marginal costs
for outsiders when departing employees cannot use the information under
trade secret protection).
321 See Lemley, supra note 28, at 339 n.119.
322 See id. at 336.
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movers.323 Fisher and Oberholzer-Gee also suggested policymakers to
incumbent innovation followers for encouraging them to invent around
existing technologies.324
Therefore, it is an exaggeration for scholars to equalize the
function of the IDD and CNCs.325 The core of applying the IDD is to
protect trade secrets rather than employee stability, regardless of whether
the freedom of employment may be conflicted with trade secret protection.
If trade secret misappropriations after employee mobility create
irreparable harm, courts may learn from the injunction rules for patents in
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C326 and carefully adopt the IDD.327
While injunctive relief means little to patent owners as a form of
remedies,328 without a public entity issuing formal property rights to trade
secret owners,329 injunctions for trade secret owners do not function more
than confirming their property rights over the information, which may
facilitate licensing the information by outsiders.330
Being lavish in adopting the IDD and granting injunctions
suggests excessive first-mover advantages, which harms competition and
small businesses and may result in market inefficiency.331 Some empirical
evidence suggests that while implementing the IDD does not increase
employee mobility and knowledge spillovers, the rules against the IDD
result in a higher level of expert mobility and knowledge spillovers.332
See id. at 340 n.122.
William W. Fisher III & Felix Oberholzer-Gee, Strategic Management
of Intellectual Property: An Integrated Approach, 55 CAL. MGMT. REV. 157, 177
(2013).
325 The appendix suggests that many states do not consistently adopt the
IDD and enforce CNCs. See Godfrey, supra note 231, at 167 (combining the
analyses of the IDD and CNCs). Cf. Patio Enclosures, Inc. v. Herbst, 39 F.
App’x. 964, 969 (6th Cir. 2002).
326 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
327 The ex parte seizure remedy under the DTSA has a similar effect,
suggested by Lobel. See Lobel, supra note 149, at 374.
328 Gene Quinn & Eileen McDermott, The Year in Patents: The Top 10
Patent
Stories
of
2019,
IPWATCHDOG.COM
(Dec.
29,
2019),
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/12/29/year-patents-top-10-patent-stories2019/id=117177/ (commenting that giving more injunctive relief functions as
restating the patent issuance and is not what patentees expect).
329 See generally Hall et al., supra note 16 (distinguishing formal IP and
informal IP).
330 See generally Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 318.
331 See Sandeen, supra note 155, at 154 (criticizing over-protection for
trade secrets). See also Lobel, supra note 149, at 377–78.
332
I.P.L. Png & Sampsa Samila, Trade Secrets Law and
Engineer/Scientist Mobility: Evidence from “Inevitable Disclosure” (Feb. 2013),
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download;jsessionid=7892A0D935B1417F
323
324
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Some empirical evidence suggests that the IDD harms innovation
quality.333 Therefore, California is a moderate model of trade secret
protection. On the one hand, it broadens the scope of trade secret
protection ex ante by protecting “readily ascertainable” information.334
On the other hand, it has a high ex post bar of enforcing the broad trade
secret by broadly not adopting the IDD but asking for actual harm.335
Least importantly in terms of innovation efficiency, Hyde in the
late 1990’s suggested that courts should compensate company reputations
under trade secret law rather than their trade secret damages,336 which was
criticized by Gilson for lack of efficiency.337 Preliminary injunctions may
function as reputational compensations in the U.S., suggested by how
copyright infringers are sued for protecting privacy,338 and also expected
by trade secret owners.339 However, companies are encouraged to receive
such reputational compensations from the patent regime, which is a filing,
examination, and registration system.340
C.

Covenants Not to Compete

Enforcing CNCs can be understood as a reward to a company for
training and investing in employees for improving their inventiveness and
KSE. Enforcing a CNC suggests low security costs for preventing
information disclosure to a company’s competitors, especially the
information being used in production (i.e., P2).341 Moreover, employee
stability also ensures the success of developing second-generation

3A3C4E0ECA9D0FA6?doi=10.1.1.308.5620&rep=rep1&type=pdf.
333 See Contigiani et al., supra note 30, at 2924.
334
See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(d) (West 2016); ABBA Rubber Co. v.
Seaquist, 286 Cal. Rptr. 518, 519 (Ct. App.1991).
335 E.g., Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co., 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 277 (Cal. Ct. App.
2002).
336
See Alan Hyde, Real Human Capital: The Economics and Law of
Shared Knowledge 137–40 (May 1998) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
N.Y.U. L. REV.); Gilson, supra note 41, at 601 (citing Hyde’s suggestion).
337 See Gilson, supra note 41, at 624.
338 See generally Andrew Gilden, Copyright’s Market Gibberish, 94 WASH.
L. REV. 1019 (2019).
339 See McGurk & Lu, supra note 307, at 205.
340 See Quinn & McDermott, supra note 328 (suggesting that preliminary
injunctions have limited benefits for patent owners since giving a preliminary
injunction is not more than repeating the USPTO’s issuance).
341
See Franco & Mitchell, supra note 60, at 583 (calling CNCs as a
surplus for employers because of preventing employees spin-out to maximize
their benefits).
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products.342 By contrast, Fosfuri and Ronde suggested that the valuable
information that can be applied in second-generation products (i.e., P3)
spurs employee mobility, knowledge spillovers, and competition. 343 In
addition, the protected information includes both the information known
to the company and the asymmetric information that is only held by
employees but can be used to compete with the company (e.g., H1).
Overall, the loss from disclosing unpublished information under CNCs can
be as low as the loss under trade secret law, which requires higher security
costs compared to CNCs. The CNC substitute for costly trade secret law
is supported by empirical evidence that where CNCs are strongly enforced,
trade secret law is not frequently claimed against employees/employers.344
CNCs are, however, inefficient when companies are uncertain
about their entitlement of the rewards, or courts are not clear about who
should be entitled to the rewards. On the side of companies, even though
the legislation does not strictly prohibit CNCs, some states usually do not
enforce CNCs, such as California.345 Moreover, the enforceable CNC
protection of information is limited to a short period, particular
geographical areas, the type of information, and the receivers of the
disclosed information. In other words, only CNCs fail to secure both the
information and the revenue generated by the information and cannot
reduce disclosure risks borne by the companies. A probable grievous
outcome of using CNCs is that innovation within companies is worsened
when employees lack the incentives and abilities to create valuable
technical information.346 CNCs increase the costs of employees to find
jobs, and reduce the incentives of employees to learn and acquire technical
information from companies.347 The legal risks of breaches of CNCs
restrict employee mobility. 348 However, the legal risks do not create
incentives for employees to transfer their knowledge to employers. Thus,
CNCs cannot eliminate asymmetry information only held by employees
(i.e., L, H1, and H2).
Fosfuri & Ronde, supra note 31, at 46.
Id. at 47–48.
344 See Png, supra note 25, at 4.
345 See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. REG. § 16600 (West 1941); CAL. LAB. CODE
§ 2802 (West 2016); Ixchel Pharma, LLC v. Biogen Inc., No. 2:17-00715, 2018
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13548, at *12–13 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2018).
346 Compare Png, supra note 25, at 8–9 (suggesting that CNCs reduce
innovation and entrepreneurship), with Barnett & Sichelman, supra note 90,
at 5 (arguing no causal relationships between CNCs and innovation and the
employee turnover).
347 See Contigiani et al., supra note 30, at 2929–31.
348
See Gilson, supra note 41, at 606 (suggesting that CNCs reduce
employee mobility but do not improve innovation).
342
343
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On the side of courts and legislators, the culture of strengthening
CNC enforcement does not benefit the public interest. Creating a culture
of anti-spillovers by CNCs prevents companies from acquiring the
benefits of spillovers from others. This culture can also be interpreted as
a culture of over-rewarding companies, especially large businesses, which
decreases competition in the market. Companies extend their market
power by CNCs rather than high-tech products, which have a relatively
short life span.349 The rewards are not free, but the rewards reduce profits
received from continued innovation.350 Companies, including the
rewarded large businesses, cannot hire leading employees from leading
companies to produce more technical information in that culture.351
Empirical evidence shows that the states with strong CNC enforcement on
average have lower employee mobility but more low-wage employees and
higher recruitment costs compared to other states.352 Moreover, the
comparison between Silicon Valley and Route 128 suggests that CNCs are
inefficient in promoting innovation in the industry of cumulative
technologies.353 Prohibiting employers from using CNCs is one
significant characteristic of Silicon Valley,354 even though no literature
supports the causal effect of this prohibition on the success of Silicon
Valley. Risch noted that companies can only rely on CNCs when the law
is not clear about the scope of trade secrets, while the uncertainties of
enforcing CNCs increase the costs in Phase I transactions.355
Moreover, CNCs may result in reverse-selection and only
unenthusiastic employees are retained.356 An innovative departing
employee following his CNC may bring the knowledge to other cities or
industries. As a result, the knowledge may spill to other cities or
industries, which may not efficiently benefit the development of domestic
innovation but benefit the society in general. Therefore, as Fosfuri and
Rønde suggested, when enforcing CNCs, courts should not treat it as an
349 See id. at 613 (explaining that CNCs in Massachusetts have provided
“critical additional protection . . . because trade secret protection of tacit
knowledge is ineffective”).
350 See Fosfuri & Ronde, supra note 31, at 47; Franco & Mitchell, supra
note 60, at 586.
351 See Franco & Mitchell, supra note 60, at 586.
352 Evan Starr et al., Mobility Constraint Externalities, 30 ORG. SCI. 961,
962 (2019).
353 See Gilson, supra note 41, at 629.
354 See id. (suggesting courts and policymakers not blindly replicate or
follow the legal model of Silicon Valley but adopt CNCs depending on their
domestic demands and industry characteristics).
355 Risch, supra note 72, at 41.
356 See Contigiani et al., supra note 30, at 2923.
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independent contract issue but rather should take the local labor market
and market competition into consideration.357 Otherwise, enforcing CNCs
suggests over-rewards and harms R&D incentives and public interests.358
Therefore, it is not surprising that the U.S. Federal Trade Commission
moved against CNCs and proposed rules to limit the use of them.359
D.

Employee Loyalty

Under the legal risks shifted by companies, it is still possible that
employees may develop their knowledge unknown to the company (i.e.,
H1, and H2) with outsiders or in spin-out startups. Then, while the valuable
information may not be a deadweight loss to the society (i.e., L), it is still
a deadweight loss to the company. It is not clear whether or not outsiders
can deploy the information more efficiently than the company. In other
words, the use of the information by a company other than the previous
employer may or may not be efficient.
It could be more efficient for the previous company to decide the
value of the asymmetric information held only by employees. Otherwise,
its early-stage investment in the information would never be collected
from outsiders or spin-out startups. The company may appreciate the
innovativeness of the contributors and invest in the information inside the
company or fund it in a subsidiary (spinoffs). However, the company
cannot force employees to utterly reveal their ideas, which form valuable
technical information. Loyal employees may be more active in revealing
their valuable or innovative ideas to the company, suggesting a lower
degree of asymmetric information only held by employees (i.e., L, H1, and
H2).
Even though it is an old story to improve employee loyalty
through management measures,360 it is controversial how courts treat
employee loyalty in trade secret cases. Strong concerns about employee
loyalty or confidential relationships lead courts to enforce fiduciary duty
without a shell of trade secrets.361 Alternatively, the strong property-right
See Fosfuri & Ronde, supra note 31, at 60.
See id.
359 Braden Campbell, Noncompete Developments to Watch for in 2020,
LAW360
(Jan.
14,
2020
10:55
PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1234422/noncompete-developments-towatch-for-in-2020-.
360 See Epstein & Levi, supra note 70, at 900–02 (suggesting that the use
of leadership or morale can improve employee loyalty).
361 See, e.g., Mass. Eye & Ear Infirmary v. QLT Phototherapeutics, Inc.,
559 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2009); NovelAire Techs., LLC v. Harrison, 2009-1372 (La.
App. 4 Cir. 10/13/10), 50 So. 3d 913. See also Graves & Tippett, supra note
357
358
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theory may substitute confidential relationships and lead courts to affirm
the property rights of companies over any information developed under
their investment and sources.362 However, the idea of assigning strong
property rights to trade secret owners has been criticized by scholars.363
In practice, the property-right theory is primarily adopted to solve patent
issues364 or criminal trade secret claims,365 but rarely adopted in civil trade
secret cases.366 In other words, courts adopt broad property rights for trade
secret owners and criminal sanctions against employees under the
Economic Espionage Act (“EEA”) to deter both trade secret thefts and the
decrease in employee loyalty.367 The question remains for future studies
on how the EEA can deter bad faith information disclosure or improve
employee loyalty. The bottom line for civil trade secret law is not to
discourage employee loyalty for creating moral-hazard crises.368
VI. Conclusion
CNCs, NDAs, and trade secret law are ineffective to protect
unpublished technical information due to legal uncertainties and
information asymmetries between companies and employees. The
197, at 88–89.
362 See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior U. v. Roche Molecular
Sys., Inc., 563 U.S. 776 (2011). See also Lobel, supra note 168, at 814.
363 See, e.g., Sandeen & Levine, supra note 25, at 366 (suggesting the law
adopts liability rule rather than property rule); Risch, supra note 72, at 27.
364
E.g., Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior U., 563 U.S. at 786
(“[U]nless there is an agreement to the contrary, an employer does not have
rights in an invention ‘which is the original conception of the employee alone.’”
(quoting United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 189 (1933));
Preston v. Marathon Oil Co., 684 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
365 See, e.g., People v. Aleynikov, 104 N.E.3d 687 (N.Y. 2018) (setting
boundaries between public domain and the company properties).
366 See, e.g., Waymo LLC v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. C 17-00939, 2017 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 73843 (N.D. Cal. May 15, 2017); Cadence Design Sys., Inc. v.
Avant! Corp., 57 P.3d 647, 650 (Cal. 2002) (“California does not treat trade
secrets as if they were property.”); Hrdy, supra note 201, at 2411–13
(introducing the trial process of the Waymo LLC v. Uber Techs., Inc.); Risch,
supra note 72, at 24–25.
367 See generally C HARLES DOYLE, CONG. RES. SERV., R42681, STEALING
TRADE SECRETS AND ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE: AN OVERVIEW OF THE ECONOMIC
ESPIONAGE ACT (Aug. 19, 2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/R42681.pdf
(explaining the EEA mechanism); Lobel, supra note 168, at 802–03 (suggesting
that the scope of the EEA definition of trade secrets is broader than the UTSA).
368 But see generally Fishman & Varadarajan, supra note 180 (proposing
applying copyright similarity standards for the determination of trade secret
misappropriations, which ignores the importance of employee loyalty and may
induce more moral-hazard issues).
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information asymmetries, which result in moral-hazard issues, decrease
innovation efficiency. When enforcing CNCs, NDAs, and trade secret
law, courts need to balance between promoting innovation incentives and
over-rewarding first-mover advantages. NDAs need to be narrowly
enforced but supplemented by trade secret law or CNCs. However, CNCs
are less efficient than trade secret law in terms of promoting innovation.
Contracts and trade secret law cannot eliminate but may aggravate the
information asymmetries, which need to be alleviated by improving
employee loyalty under internal management and the law that does not
harm employee loyalty.
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Appendix
State

USTA

CNC

Arizona

Yes

Arkansas

Yes

Californi
a

Yes

Colorado

Yes

Connecti
cut

Yes

Delaware

Yes

Florida

Yes

Georgia

Yes

Yes.
See Gann v. Morris, 596
P.2d 43 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1979).
No.
See Bendinger v.
Marshalltown Trowel
Co., 994 S.W.2d 468
(Ark. 1999).
No.
See CAL. BUS. & PROF.
CODE §§ 16600–17365
(West 2020).
No.
See Saturn Sys., Inc. v.
Militare, 252 P.3d 516
(Colo. App. 2011).
Yes.
See Aetna Ret. Servs. v.
Hug, No. CV
970479974S, 1997 Conn.
Super. LEXIS 1781
(Conn. Super. Ct. June
18, 1997).
Yes.
See W.L. Gore &
Assocs. v. Wu, C.A. No.
263-N, 2006 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 65 (Del. Ch. Mar.
30, 2006).
No, but plausibly
applicable.
See Fountain v. Hudson
Cush-N-Foam Corp., 122
So. 2d 232 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1960).
Yes, but limited
applicability to key
employees.
See GA. CODE. ANN.
§ 13-8-50 (2020); Blair
v. Pantera Enters., Inc.,

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss2/5

IDD/Actual or Threatened
Misappropriation
Not clear/decided.

IDD.
See Bendinger v.
Marshalltown Trowel Co.,
994 S.W.2d 468 (Ark.
1999).
Actual harm & no IDD.
See Whyte v. Schlage Lock
Co., 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 277
(Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
Not clear/decided.

IDD.
See Aetna Ret. Servs. v.
Hug, No. CV 970479974S,
1997 Conn. Super. LEXIS
1781 (Conn. Super. Ct. June
18, 1997).
IDD.
See E. I. Du Pont De
Nemours & Co. v. Am.
Potash & Chem. Corp., 200
A.2d 428 (Del. Ch. 1964).
Threatened harm.
See Del Monte Fresh
Produce Co. v. Dole Food
Co., Inc., 148 F. Supp. 2d
1326 (S.D. Fla. 2001).
IDD.
See Essex Grp., Inc. v.
Southwire Co., 501 S.E.2d
501 (Ga. 1998).
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Illinois

Yes

Indiana

Yes

Iowa

Yes

Kansas

Yes

Kentuck
y

Yes

Louisian
a

Yes

Marylan
d

Yes

Massach
usetts

Yes

824 S.E.2d 711 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2019).
No.
See 820 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 90/10 (2017).

No.
See
Bridgestone/Firestone,
Inc. v. Lockhart, 5 F.
Supp. 2d 667 (S.D. Ind.
1998).
Yes.
See Lamp v. Am.
Prosthetics, Inc., 379
N.W.2d 909 (Iowa
1986).
Yes.
See Idbeis v. Wichita
Surgical Specialists,
P.A., 112 P.3d 81 (Kan.
2005).
Yes.
See Charles T. Creech,
Inc. v. Brown, 433
S.W.3d 345 (Ky. 2014).
No.
See LA. STATE. ANN.
§ 23:921 (2015).
Yes, but not favored.
See Millward v.
Gerstung Int’l Sport
Educ., Inc., 302 A.2d 14
(Md. 1973);
Ecology Servs. v. Clym
Envtl. Servs., LLC, 952
A.2d 999 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 2008).
Yes.
See MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 149, § 24L
(West 2018);

Vol. 40.2

IDD.
See 765 ILL. COMP. STAT.
1065/3(a) (2009); PepsiCo,
Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d
1262 (7th Cir. 1995).
IDD,
See Ackerman v. Kimball
Int’l, Inc., 652 N.E. 2d 507
(Ind. 1995).

IDD.
See Barilla Am., Inc. v.
Wright, No. 4-02-CV90267, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12773 (S. D. Iowa
July 5, 2002).
IDD.
See Bradbury Co., Inc. v.
Teissier-duCros, 413 F.
Supp. 2d 1203 (D. Kan.
2006).
Actual harm & no IDD.
See Invesco Inst. (N.A.),
Inc. v. Johnson, 500 F.
Supp. 2d 701 (W.D. Ky.
2007).
IDD.
See LA. STATE. ANN.
§ 51:1432 (1981).
Actual harm & no IDD.
See LeJeune v. Coin
Acceptors, Inc., 849 A.2d
451 (Md. 2004).

IDD.
See ArchiText, Inc. v.
Kikuchi, No. 90572, 2005
Mass. Super. LEXIS 487
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Boulanger v. Dunkin’
Donuts Inc., 815 N.E.2d
572 (Mass. 2004).
Yes, but not favored.
See MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 445.774a (West
2020);
Huron Tech. Corp. v.
Sparling, No. 316133,
2014 Mich. App. LEXIS
1675 (Mich. Ct. App.
Sept. 11, 2014).
Yes.
See La Calhene, Inc. v.
Spolyar, 938 F. Supp.
523 (W.D. Wis. 1996).
Yes.
See Healthcare Servs.
Ozarks, Inc. v. Copeland,
198 S.W.3d 604 (Mo.
2006).

Michigan

Yes

Minnesot
a

Yes

Missouri

Yes

Nevada

Yes

No.
See NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 613.330 (2017).

New
Hampshi
re

Yes

No.
See N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 275:70 (2014).

New
Jersey

Yes

New
Mexico

Yes

Yes.
See Nat’l Starch &
Chem. Corp. v. Parker
Chem. Corp., 530 A.2d
31 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1987).
Yes.
See Bowen v. Carlsbad
Ins. & Real Estate Inc.,
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(Sup. Ct. Mass. May 19,
2005).
IDD.
See MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 445.1903 (West
1998).

IDD.
See La Calhene, Inc. v.
Spolyar, 938 F. Supp. 523
(W.D. Wis. 1996).
IDD in legislation.
See Mo. Rev. Stat.
§ 417.455.1.
But no IDDs recognized in
courts.
See Panera, LLC v. Nettles,
No. 4:16-cv-1191, 2016
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101473
(E.D. Mo. Aug. 3, 2016).
No IDD.
See Ginkgo v. V., No.
CV16-01869, 2016 Nev.
Dist. LEXIS 3183 (Nev.
Dist. Ct. Dec. 5, 2016).
Threatened harm & no IDD.
See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 350-B:2 (1990); Allot
Commc’ns., Ltd. v. Cullen,
No. 10-E-0016, 2010 N.H.
Super. LEXIS 11 (N.H.
Superior Ct. Feb. 2, 2010).
IDD.
See Nat’l Starch & Chem.
Corp. v. Parker Chem.
Corp., 530 A.2d 31 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987).
Not clear/decided.
See Insure N.M., LLC v.
McGonigle, 995 P.2d 1053
(N.M. Ct. App. 2000).
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New
York

North
Carolina

PACE LAW REVIEW

No

Close

Ohio

Yes

Oregon

Yes

Pennsylv
ania

Yes

Texas

Yes

Utah

Yes

Vermont

Yes

Virginia

Yes

724 P.2d 223 (N.M.
1986).
Yes, but not favored.
See BDO Seidman v.
Hirshberg, 712 N.E.2d
1220 (N.Y. 1999);
Sutherland Glob. Servs.,
Inc. v Stuewe, 902
N.Y.S.2d272 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2010).
Yes.
See N.C. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 75-4 (2005).
Yes.
See P & G v. Stoneham,
747 N.E.2d 268 (Ohio
Ct. App. 2000).
Yes, but can be voidable.
See OR. REV. STAT.
§ 653.295 (2020).
Yes.
See Pittsburgh Logistics
Sys., Inc. v. BeeMac
Trucking, LLC, 202
A.3d 801 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2019).
Yes.
See TEX. BUS. & COM.
CODE § 15.50 (West
2009).
Yes.
See TruGreen Cos.,
L.L.C. v. Mower Bros.,
Inc., 199 P.3d 929 (Utah
2008).
Yes, but not favorable.
See Dicks v. Jensen, 768
A.2d 1279 (Vt. 2001).

Yes.

Vol. 40.2

IDD.
See Spinal Dimensions, Inc.
v. Chepenuk, No. 4805–07,
2007 WL 2296503 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 2007).

IDD.
See Travenol Labs., Inc. v.
Turner, 228 S.E.2d 478
(N.C. Ct. App. 1976).
IDD.
See P & G v. Stoneham, 747
N.E.2d 268 (Ohio Ct. App.
2000).
Yes.
See OR. REV. STAT.
§ 653.295 (2020).
IDD.
See 12 PA. STAT. AND.
CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5302–
03 (West 2004).

Actual harm & no IDD.
See Cardinal Health Staffing
Network. Inc. v. Bowen,
106 S.W.3d 230 (Tex. App.
2003).
Threatened harm.
See CDC Restoration &
Constr., LC v. Tradesmen
Contractors., LLC, 274 P.3d
317 (Utah Ct. App. 2016).
Not clear/decided.
See Davison v.
Caleidoscope Commc’n.
Co., No. S0436-04, 2004 Vt.
Super. LEXIS 88 (Vt. Nov.
8, 2004).
Threatened harm & no IDD.
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JUDICAL REWARD ALLOCATION

Yes

See Assurance Data, Inc.
v. Malyevac, 747 S.E.2d
804 (Va. 2013).
Yes.
See Sheppard v.
Blackstock Lumber Co.,
540 P.2d 1373 (Wash.
1975).

287

See Motion Control Sys.,
Inc. v. East., 546 S.E.2d 424
(Va. 2001).
IDD.
See Moore v. Commercial
Aircraft Interiors, LLC, 278
P.3d 197 (Wash. Ct. App.
2012).

62

